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The results of this thesis show Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) has
four primary impacts on the Unrestricted Line (URL) Naval officer career. First, JPME
is an effective retention tool. Second, almost all URL officers completing JPME do so
between the 10 and 22 year points in their career. Third, a URL officer completing any
form of JPME prior to the 0-5 promotion board does not have a significantly better
chance of promoting to 0-5; whereas, a URL officer completing resident JPME prior to
the 0-6 promotion board has a significantly better chance of promoting to 0-6 — except
in the case of nonresident JPME, intermediate level Phase I/n, and the equivalents
(Federal Executive Fellowships or Foreign Service Colleges). For these three forms of
JPME, the effect on promotion is insignificant at all levels. Fourth, unlike JPME, a
URL officer completing any form of graduate education prior to the 0-5 promotion
board has a significantly better chance of promoting to 0-5. In contrast, a URL officer
completing graduate education after the 0-5 promotion board does not have a
significantly better chance of promoting to 0-6. These results seem to indicate the
potential for a critical point in the URL officer career with respect to JPME and
graduate education. Combining the proper mix of JPME and graduate education in





A. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 1
B. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 4
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 5
II. FRAMEWORK OF JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 7
A. INTRODUCTION 7
B. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY 7
1. Costs 9
2. Benefits 12
C. TRAINING VERSUS EDUCATION 19
D. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 21
E. DEFENSE REORGANIZATION 23
F. JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER 25
G. OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY ... 27
H. LITERATURE REVIEW 32
1. DOD Studies 32
2. Independent Agency Studies 34
3. Other Service Studies 35
4. Navy Studies 37
vn
III. THE SURFACE, SUBMARINE, AND AVIATION COMMUNITIES 43
A. INTRODUCTION 43
B. OVERVIEW 43
C. NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 44
D. URL OFFICER CAREER PATHS 48
E. NAVY APPROACH TO JPME 50
1
.
JPME Policy Sources and Objectives 50
2. JPME Structure 53
3. JPME Quota Plan 54
4. JPME Selection Processes 59
a. Service School (Phase I) Selection 59
b. Joint Service School (Phase II) Selection 61
5. JPME Placement Processes 63
6. JPME Payback Tour Requirements 64
F. JPME IN THE NAVY AS COMPARED TO OTHER SERVICES .... 65
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 73
A. DATA 73
B. DATA AND THE CJCS JPME MODEL 76
C. DATA FILES 78
D. DATA SETS 80
viii
1.
0-4 Promotion Board File 80
2. 0-5 Promotion Board File 82
3. 0-6 Promotion Board File 84
E. METHODOLOGY 87
F. VARIABLE DEFINITION 90
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 95
A. INTRODUCTION 95
B. COMPARISON OF VARIABLE MEANS 95
C. LOGIT AND LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS 97
1. Commander Data Set 97
2. Captain Data Set 100
D. MARGINAL EFFECTS OF JPME ON PROMOTION 103






a. JPME Completion 1
b. JPME Retention 1
2. Empirical Results 113
3. Marginal Probabilities 116
ix
C. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 117
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 119
E. FURTHER RESEARCH 120
APPENDIX A. OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 123
APPENDIX B. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER CAREER PATH 125
APPENDIX C. AVIATION OFFICER CAREER PATH 127
APPENDIX D. SUBMARINE OFFICER CAREER PATH 129
APPENDIX E. ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION DESIGNATOR (AQD) 131
APPENDIX F. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL RESIDENT SERVICE SCHOOLS 133
APPENDIX G. SENIOR LEVEL RESIDENT SERVICE SCHOOLS 133
APPENDIX H. NONRESIDENT SERVICE SCHOOLS 133
APPENDIX I. FEDERAL EXECUTIVE FELLOWSHIP (FEF) PROGRAMS 135
x
APPENDIX J. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL JOINT SERVICE SCHOOLS 135
APPENDIX K. SENIOR LEVEL JOINT SERVICE SCHOOLS 135
APPENDIX L. INTERMEDIATE AND SENIOR LEVEL JOINT SCHOOLS 135
APPENDIX M. FOREIGN SERVICE SCHOOLS 137
APPENDIX N. LIST OF VARIABLES FOR 0-5 PROMOTION MODEL 139
APPENDIX O. LIST OF VARIABLES FOR 0-6 PROMOTION MODEL 141
APPENDIX P. SPREADSHEET CALCULATIONS FOR 0-5 MARGINALS 143
APPENDIX Q. SPREADSHEET CALCULATIONS FOR 0-6 MARGINALS 145




I wish to extend a special thanks to R. Mitchell Brown, III, whose patience and guidance
provided me with significant insight concerning the history and development of the
current framework of officer Professional Military Education. Most of all, I would like to
thank my wife, Meghan, and two sons, Connor and Ryan. I am truly fortunate to have
their steadfast love and understanding, especially, throughout this process. Without their




QUALIFICATIONS OF THE NAVAL OFFICER
It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable
mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should
be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious
courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honour (sic)...
The Naval officer should be familiar with the principles of international
law, and the general practice of admiralty jurisprudence, because such
knowledge may often, when cruising at a distance from home, be
necessary to protect his flag from insult or his crew from imposition or
injury in foreign ports.
John Paul Jones
A. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
The previous quote by John Paul Jones entitled the "Qualifications of the Naval
Officer" appears at the beginning of a 1974 Department ofNavy (DON) study on officer
professional development. 1 The quote symbolizes the fact that Naval officers have
always been expected to possess a variety of professional attributes ~ both during
wartime and peacetime. The manner in which these professional attributes are initially
developed and subsequently cultivated over an officer's career is a matter of discussion
for that DON study. During its time, a study of its scope and magnitude broke new
ground in a number of areas. This thesis, by it's very nature, attempts to do something
similar. That is, break new ground in an area of research in the DON, which until now
has been the subject of very limited quantitative analysis. The particular area in question
is Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). This thesis specifically focuses on the
1 Department ofNavy, Naval Officer Professional Development, 31 May 1974.
impact that different levels, phases, and sources ofJPME have on the Unrestricted Line
(URL) Naval officer career.
The Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
(GNA) mandated the establishment of a cadre of military officers "who are specially
trained in and oriented toward joint matters." 2 This group ofjoint-specialized officers are
aptly known as Joint Specialty Officers (JSO). Subsequent implementation ofGNA
required the services to develop a system of career management dedicated to the
professional development of JSOs, including a sequence ofjoint education followed by
joint training. To this end, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was assigned
as coordinating authority for the services concerning Joint Officer Management. 3
An integral element of the Joint Officer Management process is a phased
approach to joint education. To effectively coordinate joint education, CJCS initially
established the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD), which was recently
updated and replaced by the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP).4
The OPMEP provides for a continuum ofjoint education comprised of educational
requirements that build on one another throughout five distinct levels of a career
beginning with pre-commissioning and ending at the General/Flag Officer (GFO) level.
2 U.S. Congress, Department ofDefense Reorganization Act (Goldwater -
Nichols) of 1986, Public Law 99-433, sec 661 (a), 1 October 1986.
3
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Officer Management, JCS Administration
Publication 1.2, 30 June 1989.
4 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01, Officer Professional
Military Education Policy (OPMEP), 1 March 1996.
In the Joint Officer Management process, URL Naval officers comprise a large
portion of the Navy JSO population, but not all URL officers are selected to be JSOs.
Many more URL officers actually complete some form ofJPME than eventually are
designated JSOs. In this era of declining defense budgets, it is important to determine
how scarce personnel resource investments, such as JPME, impact not only on JSOs, but
the entire URL officer population as well. This analysis proposes a method for
quantifying the impact ofJPME on the URL Naval officer career.
To examine the impact ofJPME on the URL officer career, this analysis employs
a four step approach. The first step consists of an examination of the JPME process. The
second step consists of developing a model of the JPME process, which provides a
framework for the third, and probably the most important stage, consisting of quantifying
the overall effect ofJPME on the URL Naval officer career. The fourth and final step
consists of determining any interactive effects between URL requirements ~ JPME and
graduate education (GRAD ED).
This study seeks to answer three primary research questions. They are: (1) What
is the impact ofJPME on the URL officer career? (2) Are there any interactive effects
between JPME and other forms of human capital investment, such as GRAD ED. and (3)
If so, how can the interaction between JPME and GRAD ED be efficiently and effectively
managed to ease the pressure of an already overly constrained URL Naval officer career?
B. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
To examine the impact ofJPME on the URL Naval officer career, this analysis
focuses on the promotion outcomes ofURL officers appearing before the Lieutenant
Commander (0-4), Commander (0-5) and Captain (0-6) promotion boards between
fiscal years 1986 and 1994. URL officers posing particular interest to this study are those
officers bearing the Surface (1110), Submarine (1 120), Pilot (1310) and Naval Flight
Officer (1320) Warfare designators as described by the Manual ofNavy Officer
Manpower and Personnel Classifications (MNOMPC). 5
This study begins with an examination of cross tabulations of data to initially
determine the qualitative characteristics of those URL officers completing JPME. This
technique aids in establishing general patterns in behavior of these URL officers, thereby
enabling the formulation of inferences of a JPME model developed later in the analysis.
In particular, this study identifies officers as having completed JPME by those Service
School Codes (SSC) assigned in accordance with the MNOMPC. Additionally, this study
uses Joint Additional Qualification Designators (AQD), also found in MNOMPC, to
discern Joint JPME Qualifications assigned to the officer upon completing JPME. This
final level of classification was undertaken to cross-validate SSCs and Joint AQDs.
This study utilizes three primary measures for determining the impact ofJPME on
the URL officer career. These measures include completion, retention and promotion.
Measurement of the effects of completion and retention on the URL career essentially
5 Department of the Navy, Manual ofNavy Officer Manpower and Personnel
Classifications, Volume I, NAVPERS 15839H, Washington, DC, 1 May 1992.
consists of determining when a URL officer completed JPME and whether that same
officer stays to the subsequent promotion board. For purposes of this study, JPME is
assumed to have a positive effect on retention if after completing an initial phase of
JPME, that same URL officer subsequently stays to the next promotion board.
To effectively measure and compare the effects ofJPME on promotion across the
four warfare communities for the time period in question, a number of multivariate
models are developed. Separate promotion models are developed for all officers
appearing before the Commander as well as the Captain promotion boards. Variables
introduced into each model are intended to adjust for significant variations in behavior
across warfare communities as well as for the time period in question.
The previously mentioned models are estimated using the LOGIT nonlinear
statistical method. In the final analysis, a "notional person"6 technique is used to
determine differences between marginal probabilities of promotion resulting from the
differing effects ofJPME across communities.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II begins with an explanation
of the Human Capital Theory which is the foundation upon which JPME and GRAD ED
are based. This is followed by a description of the JCS Joint Manpower Management
6 The "notional person" technique consists of deriving an overall probability of an
outcome for an average person from the population. For purposes of this illustration, the
outcome used is promotion. This technique allows estimation of a baseline probability
(i.e., a "notional person") of promotion. Once established, this baseline makes it possible
to determine the marginal effects (i.e., marginal probabilities) on promotion as a result of
changing a single variable while keeping all other variables constant ~ ceteris parabis
.
process, particularly the framework ofJPME policy. This chapter concludes with a
summary of some previous analyses regarding the topic of JPME. Chapter III provides a
summary of the four URL officer career paths, and the competing priorities between
career-specific milestones considered necessary for promotion. In addition, this chapter
provides dome insight into Navy organizational culture and how it affects the Navy's
approach to JPME. Chapter IV describes the data sets and the methodology used to
analyze, model and ultimately determine the effect ofJPME on URL officers. This
chapter shows patterns of behavior, promotion, retention and selection outcomes of
officers actually completing JPME. Chapter VI presents the empirical results of the
multivariate LOGIT analyses comparing them across the four URL communities, along
with showing some interactive effects between JPME and GRAD ED. Chapter VII
provides a summary of results in previous chapters, in addition to providing conclusions
and recommendations for further research pursuant to these findings.
II. FRAMEWORK OF JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an analysis of the current framework of Joint Professional
Military Education (JPME). It begins with an introduction ofHuman Capital Theory,7
which establishes a foundation for training and education. Next, it extends this theory to
the military setting by drawing comparisons between various human capital investments
currently found in the DON. This chapter then continues by contrasting the differences
between training and education, followed by an introduction to organizational culture.
Finally, it arrives at the CJCS Program of Joint Education (PJE) by way of a brief
summary of the historic events leading to development of the current joint manpower
management process. This chapter then concludes with a synopsis of the literature
relevant to an analysis of JPME. By this method of inspection, this thesis attempts to
decompose the JPME process into its various components, allowing closer inspection.
B. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY
In general, there are four major kinds of labor market investments a worker can
choose to undertake during a lifetime: education, training, migration, and search for new
jobs. 8 The same holds true for URL Naval officers. The type of education and training
7 For an in depth discussion of Human Capital Theory, this author suggests:
Becker, Gary S., Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1993.
8 Ehrenberg, Ronald G., Modern Labor Economics, Harper Collins College
Publishers, New York, 1994.
investments URL officers have the opportunity to undertake during a career generally fit






4. Professional military education (PME/JPME).
5. Joint training (i.e., joint duty assignment (JDA)).
The 1 996 Department of Defense (DOD) Military Manpower Training Report
reveals a large portion of the DOD human capital investment dollars are specifically
devoted to advanced training, graduate education and PME/JPME for military officers. 10
Although, this report shows the importance the military places on these investments, it is
also critical to note, the demand for each of these investments varies depending upon
what point a URL Naval officer happens to be at during his/her career.
To draw a basic similarity between these investments and other kinds of
investments, economists refer to them as investments in human capital. Human Capital
is a term that conceptualizes workers as embodying a set of skills that can be "rented out"
to employers (Ehrenberg, 1993). In this simplistic relationship, Human Capital Theory
provides a theoretical foundation for all forms of training and education investments.
Human Capital Theory, provides a fundamental basis for this analysis.
9 Department of Defense, Military Careers, GPO, Washington, DC, 1994.
10 Department of Defense, Military Manpower Training Report (FY J 997),
Washington, DC, June 1996.
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Total wealth within society is considered to be made up of a combination of two
types of capital, which are often referred to as human and non-human capital. Human
capital includes accumulated investments in such activities as education, job training, and
migration, whereas nonhuman capital includes society's stock of land, buildings, and
machinery (Ehrenberg, 1993). In other words, human capital can be thought of as
intangible wealth, and non-human capital material or tangible wealth. This distinction is
used, because tangible wealth is readily apparent; whereas, intangible wealth is not. Even
though, human capital is less apparent than non-human in some respects, the earnings
from this type of investment are expected to be of a much higher level (Ehrenberg, 1993).
Generally speaking, this is true because there are a number of costs and benefits
associated with human capital investment decisions. Human capital investment
expenditures can be divided into three different cost categories: personal costs,
opportunity costs, and psychic costs. Additionally, human capital investment
expenditures can be divided into four different benefit categories: increased skill, greater
responsibility, increased earnings over a lifetime, and social benefit. This following
discussion focuses on each of these categories of human capital investment. Costs will be
addressed first.
1. Costs
The first type of cost is personal costs. Personal costs generally take into account
those out-of-pocket or direct expenses associated with a decision to invest in human
capital. Personal costs generally include, but are not necessarily limited to costs for
tuition, books and fees, moving expenses, expenses for job search (i.e., house hunting),
clothing (i.e., uniforms), and time. Take for example, the URL officer who chooses to
complete resident JPME. By making this decision, the officer also chooses to incur all
personal costs. One alternative to minimize personal cost might be to complete
nonresident JPME (correspondence or seminar). If the officer chooses to complete JPME
in this manner, the only potential personal cost is time. However, by making a decision
not to complete JPME, the URL officer is able to personal costs altogether.
As to be expected with any decision, there are hidden costs. They are referred to
as opportunity costs. Opportunity costs consist of the highest possible alternative
foregone as a result of making the original investment decision (Ehrenberg, 1993). In the
previous section, the URL officer who chose to complete resident JPME also chose to
bear the brunt of all personal costs associated with that decision. However, by electing
this decision, there is also an associated opportunity cost to be considered. By completing
resident JPME, this officer might have foregone an opportunity for an important
operational assignment within his/her URL community. In this instance, the operational
assignment comprises the highest possible alternative foregone ~ the opportunity cost.
By deciding to complete resident JPME the officer was unable to complete additional
community-specific training, which in the long run might have contributed more to
his/her overall warfare proficiency and personal community reputation.
The opposite is also true of an officer who decides to forego JPME in lieu of an
important community assignment, only to find that he/she would have been better off by
the experience and knowledge gained by completing JPME. This officer could have
gained an important advantage when compared to the other officers with respect to
10
experience and personal reputation within his/her own URL community. However, by
electing to stay within the community to gain additional experience, the officer may not
necessarily find himself/herself better off. In this case, a decision to complete JPME
might otherwise have served that officer better in the long run. Consequently, a decision
to stay within the URL community might also have some associated opportunity costs to
be considered as well.
There are a number of psychic costs involved with any decision to pursue
education. It goes without saying, education can be difficult, even boring at times. The
degree of difficulty encountered generally varies from person to person. Some officers
are simply able to learn faster than others. Therefore, the manner in which each officer is
able to make personal adjustments to maintain pace with the educational process can tend
to impose significant psychic costs.
Another psychic cost is found in the job search process, which can also be quite
tedious and frustrating. The manner in which a URL officer approaches this process can
take a heavy toll on the individual. Associated with any decision to change assignments,
is the requirement to alter living circumstances, say goodbye to old friends, become
acquainted with new friends, and reorient oneself with the unfamiliar surroundings of a
new duty station. Consequently, moving can impose significant psychic costs, especially
when borne out over the course of a typical URL career. It's not surprisingly then, that
psychic costs weigh heavily into the decision to pursue any kind of educational
investment, such as JPME.
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2. Benefits
For the URL officer, the decision to invest in human capital can have any number
of associated benefits. A list of potential benefits might include: increased skill, greater
responsibility, and increased earnings. These benefits comprise what is referred to as the
core job dimensions. Changing any one of the core dimensions has the potential of
increasing the motivating potential of an individual. 11 All of these core job dimensions
are very important, because they directly relate to personal job satisfaction. Although the
first two benefits of increased skill and greater responsibility prove to be very important,
they vary from person to person. As a result, they prove somewhat difficult to quantify.
However, promotion in the military serves as a direct measure for each of these core job
dimensions. Consequently, it provides a suitable "proxy" for measuring the effect of
different forms of human capital investment decisions on the URL officer career.
Calculating benefits over time requires a concept known as discounting.
According to (Ehrenberg, 1993), benefits received in the future are worth less now than
an equal amount of benefits received today for two reasons. First, if a person plans to
consume benefits, that person would probably prefer to consume them as early as
possible. Second, if a person plans to invest the monetary benefits rather than use them
for consumption, then that person can earn interest on the investment enlarging funds in
the future. No matter how a person intends to use benefits, future receipts are discounted
to some extent.
11 Bolman, Lee G. and Terrence E. Deal, Refraining Organizations, Jossey Bass,
San Francisco, CA, 1991.
12
The present value of a stream of yearly benefits (B) over time (T) can be estimated
by using a present value calculation (Ehrenberg, 1993) in the following manner:
Present Value (PV)
B, B„ 5, B,
(It) (l + r)2 (Urf (It)7
(2.1)
In equation 2.1, r represents the interest rate (or discount rate). Providing r remains
positive, benefits in the future are progressively discounted. For example, if r is 0.05,
benefits payable the first day of a 20 year career would receive a current weight
amounting to 38 percent of the weight placed on benefits payable in 20 years (1.05 20 =
2.65; 1/2.65 = 0.38). In other words, a dollar in 20 years would be valued at 38 cents
today. Table 1 illustrates the smaller the r is, the greater the weight placed on future
benefits. Table 1 also shows the weight placed on future benefits tends to increase as an
officer approaches retirement eligibility age, which in most cases is 20 years. 12
Table 2.1. Years to Retirement vs Weight of Future Benefits (for different values of r)
YEARS TO RETIREMENT WEIGHT OF FUTURE BENEFITS (%)
r 0.03 0.05 0.07
20 55 38 26
15 64 48 36
10 74 61 51
5 86 78 71
100 100 100
12
Rostker, Bernard, (et. al.), The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of
1980, A Retrospective Assessment, RAND (R-4246-FMP), Santa Monica, CA, 1993.
13
Investing in human capital, such as JPME, is only worthwhile for the individual if
the present value of a stream of benefits net of costs is greater than that for another form
of human capital. Educational costs, such as those for JPME, are normally incurred over
a very short period of time. As a result, these costs can be quite high. For example, in the
case of the URL officer who chooses to complete JPME when, in fact, the more
conservative decision might have been to stay in his/her community providing additional
warfare experience, the opportunity costs are potentially quite high. Hence, the decision
to complete any form of human capital investment such as JPME has the potential impact
of producing very different streams of earnings over the course of a career ~ one stream
for one decision and another stream for a completely different decision. Figure 1



















Figure 1. Alternative Earnings Streams. From (Ehrenberg, 1993)."
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The dotted line in Figure 1 shows a distinct difference in the earning streams
between person A, the officer who chose not to undertake the investment (JPME), and
person B, the one who actually did choose the investment (JPME). This concept can also
hold true for URL officers trying to make an investment decision between any form of
human capital. However, if other costs such as psychic or opportunity costs for that
individual are very large compared to personal costs, then the investment might become
very expensive compared to alternative decisions. In this case, the person may choose the
alternative, which is not to invest.
The preceding discussion highlights that investing in human capital (JPME) is
only worthwhile for an individual if the present value of the benefits (monetary and
psychic) is at least as large as the costs. In mathematical terms this relationship is









(1 r) (l rf (1 r)3 (1 r)T
In equation (2.2), C represents the total costs ofJPME and B the yearly difference in
earnings between JPME and non-JPME graduates. This equation represents what is
known as a Formal Investment Choice Model (Ehrenberg, 1993). It's doubtful many URL
officers resort to as sophisticated a model as the one represented by equation (2.2) when
trying to decide whether to invest in JPME. One reason is costs from JPME are front-
loaded and don't necessarily require formal discounting. Therefore, it's likely officers
make less formal estimates which take into account similar factors. (Ehrenberg, 1993)
15




Most students will be young.
2. Present-oriented people are less likely to complete education than people who
are forward-looking {ceteris parabis)
.
3. Attendance will decrease if the costs rise {ceteris parabis).
4. Attendance will increase if the gap between earnings of graduates and non-
graduates widens {ceteris parabis).
The term present-oriented is normally found in a psychological context.
However, in the current context it describes people who do not weigh future events or
outcomes very heavily (Ehrenberg, 1993). Obviously, all people discount for future
events, depending on the situation some may tend to do this more than others. One
extreme case includes the person whose discount rate is so high, that person essentially
fails to consider future events altogether. Hence the term present-oriented. On the other
extreme is the person whose discount rate is so low, that person essentially fails to
consider current events altogether. Hence the termfuture-oriented.
As the model indicates, given similar yearly benefits of completing education,
younger people have a larger present value of total benefits than older workers simply
because they have a longer remaining work life ahead of them (Ehrenberg, 1993).
Additionally, (Ehrenberg, 1993) shows medical statistics supporting the model's
suggestion of people who have a high propensity to invest in education also engage in
other forward-looking behaviors. These two points may help provide answers to two
questions: (1) Why do some URL officers tend to invest in human capital more than
16
others at earlier stages in their careers? and (2) Why do some URL officers tend to invest
in human capital more than others all throughout their careers?
Another prediction of the model indicates "human capital investments are more
likely when costs are lower" (Ehrenberg, 1993). (DON, 1974) suggests the benefits of
GRAD ED and JPME vary throughout the URL career. (DON, 1974) further suggests
GRAD ED is a very important factor early on in the URL officer's career. Whereas,
(DON, 1974) suggests JPME becomes an important factor at intermediate to later stages
of an officer's career, this model along with these statements allows one to draw a
relationship between the cost of different forms ofhuman capital during the URL career
and to infer the following corollaries. The greater the importance an investment happens
to be for a specific point in a career, the higher the opportunity cost of investing in
alternative forms of human capital. Alternatively, the lesser the importance an
investment happens to be for a specific point in a career, the lower the opportunity cost of
investing in alternative forms of human capital. The converse of these two statements
can be postulated as well.
The logic of the preceding argument allows this analysis to draw an inverse
relationship between the importance ofJPME and GRAD ED as a function of timing in
the URL career. The difficulty for the URL officer then becomes deciding between forms
of human capital investment during a career. Particularly, when it comes to deciding
between JPME and GRAD ED. One possible consideration is at what point(s) in the
career do JPME and GRAD ED provide maximum benefit to the overall career. This
analysis provides a model to aid the URL officer in determining the importance of these
17
investments during his/her career. In so doing, this analysis explores the possibility of an
"offset point" between JPME and GRAD ED in the URL career.
According to (Ehrenberg, 1993), another prediction of human capital theory is
"the demand for education is positively related to the increases in lifetime earnings or
psychic benefits that a(n)...education allows. This predication relates the potential
increase in earnings an officer might expect from a human capital investment.
Admittedly, pay does not differ significantly between officers of the same rank and time
in service. However, promotion translates into pay differences. Therefore, URL officers
might reasonably expect an added benefit from an investment in human capital when it
relates to increased promotion potential. That is, an officer who invests in human capital
might be more productive than one who does not. Therefore, that same officer might
reasonably expect to have a higher probability of promotion than one who does not. This
discussion raises the overall question: What might be a reasonable expectation of
promotion from having completed JPME or GRAD ED? The model derived during the
course of this analysis provides the URL officer with possible answers to this question.
A previous section of this analysis made a distinction between two types of capital
wealth within our society ~ human and non-human capital. In as much as human capital
is considered intangible wealth, there are elements which actually succeed in providing an
indirect benefit. An obvious indirect benefit is a social benefit. The military has long
been known as a profession of opportunity. That is, the military is looked upon a part of
society where a person, regardless of stature, has an opportunity to obtain training and
education, and subsequently advance based on his/her own personal merit. In other
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words, the military is considered a virtual meritocracy. Often times, some members of
society might not otherwise have been able to invest in training and education had they
not been able to join the military. Therefore, the effect of education and training provided
by the military is to increase the overall stock ofhuman capital within society. The
following illustration attempts to show that the investment in human capital obtained
while in the military isn't necessarily limited to the time an officer remains in the military.
When an individual makes a decision to terminate his/her employment with the
military, that decision doesn't necessarily signal the end of the human capital investment.
Case in point is a URL officer, who after receiving substantial training and education
from the military subsequently decides to separate from the service. This same officer is
successful in obtaining a position with a firm in direct support of the defense industry.
Firms of this type are often referred to in the context of the defense industrial base. Even
though the former human capital investment for that officer might have been paid for by
the military, the investment is not necessarily considered a total write off. A more
favorable way to refer to this investment might be think of it as a shift of resources ~
from one area of the defense industrial base to another for its continued effective and
efficient use. Seen in a broader social context, military-derived human capital can be
considered a renewable investment within society (e.g., military training of pilots and
value to commercial airlines).
C. TRAINING VERSUS EDUCATION
At this point in the analysis, it seems appropriate to make a distinction between
two forms ofhuman capital — training and education. Training is defined as "the formal
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procedures a company utilizes to facilitate learning so the resultant behavior contributes
to the attainment of the company's goals and objectives." 13 From this definition it is
readily apparent training is a human capital investment which provides for the attainment
of three types of skills. These skills include: motor, cognitive, and interpersonal. The
purpose of training is to achieve some behavioral change to affect an organizational
outcome. For training to be effective and transferrable, though, it is recommended it be
conducted in a setting closely resembling the work environment (Muchinsky, 1993). In a
traditional sense, this means training should be done on-the-job or at a location closely
resembling the work place.
Skills provided by training prove to be perishable if they are not utilized
immediately and routinely. The most important aspect about training is "the skills
training teaches are typically attained for the express purpose of achieving particular goals
and objectives, as such many organizations try to keep training "firm specific" so they
will not be training people for their competitors" (Muchinsky, 1993). For an organization
where goals and objectives change quite rapidly, training provides the most beneficial
form of human capital. Consequently, "those people who have the ability to learn quickly
are those most likely to seek out, and be presented by employers with, training
opportunities" (Ehrenberg, 1993).
In contrast to training, education primarily focuses on developing cognitive skills
more than it does on motor or interpersonal skills. Although, in the long run education
13 Muchinsky, Paul M., Psychology Applied to Work, Brooks and Cole Publishing
Company, Pacific Grove, CA, 1993.
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may have a profound effect on increased development of these latter skills as well.
Education tends to be more broad-based than training, providing a person with the
cognitive skills to approach any number of challenges. Therefore, the effects of education
may last longer than the effects from training. As a result, education is also capable of
taking a person throughout a longer period in life. However, for education to be effective,
it must be performed in a setting totally devoid of the work environment. This element is
essential, because for education to be effective it should not be interrupted. Father
Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., former President of the University ofNotre Dame, sums
up the "true educational" experience in the following manner. "Great educational
sophistication is needed to perceive where change is essential, so that change may occur
in a fruitful and orderly fashion, not just substituting a new for an old disorder." 14
This analysis has shown the effects of training and education on an individual are
intended to cause a behavioral change. To achieve organizational goals, behavioral
change is often necessary. As the next section will show, individual behaviors translate
into organizational behavior, which can be good or bad depending upon the situation.
D. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
The previous section showed that one of the effects of training and education is to
produce a change in behavior. In an organizational context, behaviors have a tendency to
evolve into what has been described as a culture. One of the more recently identified
components of social systems is the concept of organizational culture. According to
14 Mueller, Thomas J. Ames, Charlotte A., Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, Commitment,
Compassion, Consecration, Sunday Visitor Publishing, Huntington, IN, 1989.
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(Muchinski, 1993), the concept of culture was originally proposed by anthropologists to
describe societies, and has been found useful in describing organizations. (Muchinsky,
1993) defines organizational culture as:
a) a pattern of basic assumptions,
b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group,
c) as it learns to cope with problems of external adaptation and internal
integration
d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore,
e) is to be taught to new members of the organization
f) as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.
This definition of culture shows it to be both an asset and a liability. It is an asset
when the shared beliefs ease and economize communications, and shared values generate
higher levels of cooperation and commitment than otherwise can be possible. It is a
liability when the shared beliefs and values are not in keeping with the needs of the
organization, its members, other constituents and society. In order to bring about cultural
change in an organization it is necessary to change any one of five factors including:
behavior, justification of behavior, cultural communications, hiring and socializing, and
weeding out. 15 Figure 2 shows a general depiction of how culture perpetuates itself and
points at which managers might intervene to change culture within an organization.
15 Mainiero, Lisa A. and Tromley, Cheryl L, Developing Managerial Skills in









O Managers seeking to create cultural
change must intervene at thesepoints.
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Figure 2. How Culture Perpetuates Itself. From (Bolman, 1991).
DEFENSE REORGANIZATION
Figure 2 is highly representative ofhow military organizational culture has
evolved over the years. Seen as dysfunctional by many, prior to 1986, a number of
attempts were made to change military culture. However, none proved as effective at
changing military culture as the attempt made by members of the ninety-ninth Congress
in 1986. This concerted effort, after a number of years, culminated in passage of the
Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA).
By some, GNA was seen as going too far. Within the services, service chiefs
viewed GNA as a frontal attack. From an outsider's perspective many were concerned that
by "aligning the military services it might have an adverse affect by making them too
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strong."
16 In defense of this point, some went so far as to draw historic parallels between
the JCS and German General Staffs under leaders like Graf Von Moltke (the elder). By
others, GNA was seen as not going far enough.' 7 In spite of the rhetoric, the services
were still seen as "parochial" to their own interests. Prior to GNA any one of them could
effectively weaken the defense process by simply casting their veto. What was there to
stop any one of them from doing that same thing now? Fortunately, as a result of GNA,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) didn't need full consensus of the
services to move ahead on defense issues. Nevertheless, everyone agreed, GNA meant
serious business to service culture ~ especially the Navy. The question remained: How
would the services react to this cultural change? The following list outlines those
principal changes brought about by GNA:
1
.
Established the Chairman as principal advisor to the President and Secretary
of Defense on all military issues, including JPME;
2. Defined "joint matters" as relating to integrated employment of land, sea,
and air forces in the areas of national military strategy, strategic and
contingency planning, and command and; control of combat operations under
unified planning, and command and control of combat operations under
unified command;
3 Created a JSO career track to improve the quality and performance of officers
assigned to joint duty; mandated that critical positions identified in joint
organizations be filled only with JSOs contingent upon completion of JPME;
16
Previdi, Robert, Civilian Control Versus Military Rule, Hippocrene Books, New
York, NY, 1988.
17 Adolph, Robert B. (et. al.), Why Goldwater - Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough,
Joint Forces Quarterly, GPO, Washington, DC, Spring 1995.
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4. Mandated maintaining "rigorous standards" at JPME institutions for
educating JSOs, where previously there had been neither joint educational
programs nor required standards;
5. Mandated promotion policy objectives for officers in joint duty assignments,
objectives directing that as a group these officers should be promoted at a rate
comparable to officers serving on service staffs in the military departments.
6. Required newly promoted General and Flag Officers (G/FOs) to attend
Capstone course, to prepare them to work with all the services.
7. Designated a JPME focal point in the Vice Director, Operational Plans and
Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, dual hatted as the Deputy Director, Joint
Staff, for Military Education overseeing Military Education Division (J-7). 18
F. JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER
GNA established the requirement for each service to develop a pool of officers
particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters (GNA, 1986). These officers
are currently referred to as Joint Specialty Officers (JSO). GNA also mandated the
services conceive a system of career management for these JSO's. The resulting JSO
career path is outlined in JCS Administration Publication 1.2, and profiles the routes a
military officer can follow to successfully achieve the JSO designation. In 1994, the
RAND Corporation began a study of Joint Officer Management, and following two years
of intense research, completed a three-part analysis of the process. 19 However, this study
only focused on one part of the JPME process. Therefore, this thesis has taken and
modified the resulting Joint Supportability Model from the RAND study, showing the
18 Graves, Howard D. and Snider, Don M., Emergence ofthe Joint Officer, Joint
Forces Quarterly, GPO, Washington, DC, Autumn 1996.
19
Harrell, Margaret C. (et. al.), How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty
Assignments, RAND (MR-593-JS), Santa Monica, CA, 1996.
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entire JSO process from start to finish. The resultant model serves as a depiction of the
entire JSO process. This modified version of the RAND Joint Supportability Model is


















Figure 3. JSO Designation Process. After (Harrell, 1996).
Close inspection of figure 3 reveals some unique characteristics about the JSO
designation process. One prominent feature is a two-phased sequence of JPME required
for JSO designation. Although, the RAND study was primarily concerned with the
second phase of the process, the following quote from the study highlights the issue of
JPME as the primary stumbling block for the services in the Joint Supportability Model:
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The services may have the officers with the skills required by the Joint
Duty Assignment (JDA) billet, but these officers may not have JPME
qualifications. This problem has decreased significantly as the services
have changed their policies for selecting JPME attendees, who now better
reflect the skill requirements of JDA' s. It is worth noting, however, that
the current JSO population is, to some degree, a reflection of the JPME
selection process of several years ago, which was less proactive in
selecting attendees with the appropriate skills. JPME continues to pose
the most significant factor in the JSO designation process. (Harrell, 1996)
These comments from the RAND study serve to suggest one possible way to
improve the overall understanding of the impact ofJPME might be by enlarging the focus
of future analyses to include a study of the impacts ofJPME on all officers electing this
form of investment. This thesis succeeds in broadening the scope of the RAND study,
ever so slightly, by analyzing the effects ofJPME on all URL Naval officers. The
following section makes it possible to formulate a basic model of the JPME process with
which to analyze the effects ofJPME on the URL Naval officer career. It does so by
identifying three major distinctions in the current JPME framework, which consist of:
level, phase and source of JPME.
G. OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY
Joint education is described "as a career-long effort." Therefore, in 1996, CJCS
promulgated the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) document
(CJCS, 1996). This policy document effectively provided a framework ofJPME for all
services. A copy of this framework is contained in Appendix A (CJCS, 1996). Close
inspection of Appendix A reveals three distinct characteristics, which include: level,
phase, and source of JPME.
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The first characteristic, level, shows a differentiation between five different
military educational levels: pre-commissioning, primary, intermediate, senior, and
General/Flag Officer (GFO). Each of these five levels is considered by (CJCS, 1996) to
be very important in the professional development of a military officer. The pre-
commissioning level is conducted at institutions and through programs currently
producing commissioned officers for the services. The primary level is conducted at
grades 0-1 through 0-3. The intermediate level is typically conducted at the grade of
0-4; whereas, the senior level is conducted at grades 0-5 and/or 0-6. The levels of
JPME of concern to this analysis consist of the intermediate and senior level. Therefore,
for purposes of this thesis, any further discussion ofJPME refers to the intermediate and
senior levels of (joint) professional military education.
The second characteristic, phase, shows a differentiation in the approach to JPME
at both the intermediate and senior levels. Unique to these two levels is a two-phased
approach to JPME. With a few minor exceptions, Phase I is primarily conducted at
Service schools, and Phase II is conducted at joint schools falling under the cognizance
of the National Defense University (NDU). "This two-step approach to JPME provides
for an interdependent relationship between the joint and Service schools." (CJCS, 1996)
The third characteristic, source, shows differentiations between the method of
delivery of JPME. The following outline provides an summary of the various sources of
Intermediate and Senior level JPME currently available today.20
20 For an in depth discussion of these sources this author recommends:





Intermediate level Phase I institutions
a. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC)
b. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC)
c. College ofNaval Command and Staff (CNCS)
d. Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC)
e. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
f. Service college nonresident programs (seminar and correspondence)
g. Equivalent fellowships and foreign military schools21
2. Intermediate level Phase II institutions
a. Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) after 1990
3. Intermediate level Phase I / II institutions
a. Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) prior to 1990
(OPMEP), CJCS Instruction 1800.01, GPO, Washington, DC, March 1, 1996.
(2) Koran, John G., Manpower Managementfor Joint Specialty Officers: A Comparative
Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA, 1990.
(3) Clark, Edward S., A Comparative Analysis ofIntermediate Service College (ISC)
Phase IJoint Professional Military Education (JPME), Naval Postgraduate School
Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA, March, 1990.






Senior level Phase I institutions
a. Air War College (AWC)
b. Army War College (USAWC)
c. College ofNaval Warfare (CNW)
d. Marine Corps War College (MCWAR)
e. Service college nonresident courses (seminar and correspondence)
f. Equivalent fellowships and foreign military schools22
2. Senior level Phase II institutions
a. Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) after 1990
3. Senior level combined Phase I and Phase II institutions
a. National War College (NATL)
b. Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
The previous discussion highlights three characteristics of the JPME framework,
consisting of level, phase and source. These characteristics serve as the basis of
distinction for the JPME model in this analysis. Figure 4 serves to summarize the
preceding discussion by grouping these overall characteristics.
22 Senior Phase I credit no longer awarded for fellowship completion after 1999.
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Figure 4. Levels, Phases, and Sources ofJPME.
The CJCS Framework for Joint Professional Military Education (CJCS, 1996)
provides the basis for developing a model to aid in determining the impacts ofJPME on
the URL Naval officer career. The most obvious distinctions in this framework include
three dimensions. The first dimension consists of levels of education — both Intermediate
and Senior. The second dimension lying immediately below the first, consists of different
phases of JPME. The third dimension lying directly below the second, consists of
methods of completion, which include: resident, nonresident (seminar or
correspondence), equivalent programs (fellowships and foreign service schools). All
these dimensions provide a basic method of classification for the JPME framework,
which in turn provides the basic distinctions used to construct the model in this analysis.
With these subtle characteristics in mind, Chapter III attempts to address the data and
methodology employed in this analysis. The final section of this chapter will provide an
overall review of the literature pertaining to this type of analysis of JPME.
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H. LITERATURE REVIEW
Until GNA occurred there hadn't been very many studies performed on the topic
of JPME. Several of these studies have already been alluded to in this analysis.
However, there are a number of other studies that have not been mentioned. This section
provides a brief summary of these additional studies on JPME pertaining to this analysis.
Overall, studies that have been performed on the topic ofJPME can be divided into four
different categories. These categories include: DOD, Independent Agencies, Other
Services, and the Navy studies. This analysis begins with the DOD studies.
1. DOD Studies
Following WWII, the face of military education reflected individual Service needs
until 1975, at which time the DOD Committee on Excellence in Education recommended
many changes to the existing structure of military education. One significant outcome
resulting from that study was the establishment of the National Defense University
(NDU) at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. Again, military education remained much the
same until 1982, when the CJCS, General David C. Jones chartered a study to improve
the organizational process of the JCS system. A significant outcome of this study in 1983
was the first Joint Professional Military Education Policy Document (MEPD). In 1986,
GNA became law. GNA prompted a significant increase in the number of studies
devoted to reassessing the military educational system. According to the OPMEP
(CJCS, 1996), seven major studies have resulted from GNA, These studies include:
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1.
The Dougherty Board on Senior Military Education (1987) - Focused on a
need for increased and improved joint education. Recommended
improvements in structure, curriculum content, student ratio and activity of
intermediate and senior level Service schools.
2. Rostow-Endicott Assessment on the Teaching of Strategy and Foreign Policy
at the Senior War Colleges (1987) - Reinforced importance of educating
officers in national security issues.
3. The Morgan Initial Certification Group (1989)- Recommended CJCS
curricula validation at 10 intermediate and senior level Service schools for
AY 1988 - 1989 with follow-on Phase I accreditation for classes thereafter.
4. National Defense University Transition Planning Committee (1989) -
evaluated the need for and feasibility of transforming NDU into a National
Center for Strategic Studies.
5. House Armed Services Committee Panel on Military Education (1989) -
Established a two-phased system ofjoint education beginning with education
at the Service Schools followed by the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC).
6. Joint Professional Military Education Review Panel (1994) - Recommended
policy changes in officer professional military education resulting in 1996
CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP).
7. Joint Vision 2010 - Objective is to provide a conceptual blueprint for
preparing the Armed Forces for the 21st century.
The last study, Joint Vision 2010 is a concerted effort on the part of the Joint Staff
toward clarifying the future direction of the armed forces for the 21st century. Not one
year old yet and already, JV 2010, is providing significant direction for the services. The
stated goal of Joint Vision 2010 is:
...to leverage technological advances, integrate new operational concepts,
and channel the vitality and innovation of the services to achieve a more
seamless and coherent effect on future battlefields. Joint Vision 2010
creates a template for change that will guide the evolution of future joint
doctrine, PME, and training. (CJCS, 1996)
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It is apparent from this comment that JPME provides the foundation from which
to address future issues that might possibly confront the military services. The reason for
this reliance on JPME is its ability to provide an officer with an essential understanding
of the science and art of war. This overall understanding is vital, given the fact that the
military is going through what many refer to as a Revolution in Military Affairs. 23 In
(Galdi, 1995), calls this period a revolution because of its characteristic tendencies toward
rapidly changing pace of technology and information. Hence, there is a growing demand
for a broader understanding of military affairs.
2. Independent Agency Studies
A number of Independent Agency Studies have emerged as a result of findings
from these previous DOD studies. One recent study conducted by the RAND
Corporation (Harrell, 1 996) was undertaken in an effort to determine the feasibility and
management of the personnel and education requirements mandated by GNA. This study
focused on a number ofjoint Supportability issues ~ one issue happened to be JPME.
While the HASC established a two-step approach to JPME, the RAND study chose to
primarily focus on the second phase, because according to the RAND Joint Supportability
Model Phase II is the choke point in the process. To gather information about JPME,
RAND administered a questionnaire to all Joint officers to ascertain whether JPME was
effectively preparing them for a joint assignment. Findings from this study reveal that a
majority of the officers polled felt JPME effectively prepared them for their assignment.
23
Galdi, Teodor W., Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts,
Organizational Responses, Outstanding Issues, Washington, DC, November 30, 1995.
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Another study on the effectiveness ofJPME is currently being conducted by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). This study is being conducted as
an overall review of the professional military educational system, and includes the
military academies, the Service Colleges as well as the military graduate schools.24 At
time of completion of this thesis, results of the CSIS study were not available for review.
3. Other Service Studies
The other services, primarily the Air Force and the Army, seem to have been the
most proactive at conducting analyses pertaining to JPME. A vast majority of the studies
found concerning JPME were generated by these two services. The most relevant service
studies were completed by Air Force officers. The first of these was a Doctoral
Dissertation completed by Major Richard Burroughs, USAF25
,
which consisted of an
analysis of Air Force officer perceptions of the Air Command and Staff College's
(ACSC) Nonresident Correspondence Program. The methodology used in this study
consisted of analysis of survey results administered to ACSC resident and nonresident
attendees. The results of this study show Air Force officers believed resident Service
school completion provided a significant contribution to their improved professional
development, while correspondence completion did not.
24 Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS).
25 Burroughs, Richard, Perceptions ofAir Command and StaffCollege's
Nonresident Correspondence Program, University of Southern California, Doctoral
Thesis, January, 1987.
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Another Air Force Officer study by Major Ronald Stevens, USAF26
, consisted of
an analysis of the effects of intermediate Service school completion on the careers of Air
Force Officers. The methodology he used consisted of statistical t-tests to compare for
significant differences in means between retention, promotion and selection to command
of Air Force officers completing resident intermediate Service schools. This study found
significant differences in the method ofJPME completion for all three of these measures
of effectiveness. This study found those Air Force officers completing resident Service
school were more likely to promote to 0-5 and 0-6, stay in the service, and select for
command than those who had done so via nonresident means.
The last Air Force Officer study by Captain James Bruns, USAF27
,
addressed the
impact of non-performance factors on the promotion of Air Force officers to 0-4, 0-5
and 0-6. The methodology used in this analysis consisted of a multivariate LOGIT
regression technique to determine those variables providing a significant impact on
promotion. Again, this researcher found Air Force Officers completing resident JPME
had significantly greater probability of promotion to 0-5 and 0-6.
26 Stevens, Ronald L., An Analysis ofthe Effects ofIntermediate Service School
Professional Military Education Completion on the Careers of United States Air Force
Officers, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991.
27 Bruns, James W., A Comparison ofNon-Performance Characteristics with
United States Air Force Officer Promotions, Air Force Institute of Technology, Master's
Thesis, Wright Patterson, AFB, OH, September, 1993.
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4. Navy Studies
Mentioned earlier, The 1 974 Naval Officer Professional Development Study
(DON, 1974), broke new ground by establishing seven priorities in Naval officer
professional development. The study recommended these seven priorities (DON, 1974):
1
.
Training for fleet officer personnel.
2. Graduate education in the technical fields to meet minimum requirements;
and, professional military education for a select group of Captains and
Commanders with the goal of 35 percent of the Captains having had this
education.
3. Training for fleet support officer personnel.
4. Graduate education in other areas to meet minimum requirements (in non-
technical areas, officers should be strongly encouraged to use nontraditional
educational opportunities).
6. Command and staff level professional military education to meet a goal of
educating 50 percent of each year group. (Officers who do not have the
opportunity to attend the resident course, should be strongly encouraged to
enroll in service college nonresident courses).
7. Basic professional military education for about 20 percent of the 0-3s.
A number of these (DON, 1974) study recommendations seem to have endured
the test of time. Particularly, the relative priorities established between the different
forms of human capital investment. The Military Manpower Training Report for FY97
(DOD, 1 996) shows fleet training is still the Navy's number one priority followed by the
others listed above in descending order. Knowing that these priorities still exist, even
today, provides a strong frame of reference from which to base the Navy's philosophical
approach to military human capital investment.
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Even in 1989 the Navy's response to the House Armed Services Committee
Review of Professional Military Education seems to emerge from a similar philosophical
base as provided by the 1974 report. The Navy conducted study group examined the
recommendations of the Skelton Panel. 28 One Panel recommendation stood out in the
report, the panel found Navy PME as basically sound, but improvable. One of the
recommended areas for improvement consisted of bringing the PME system in line with
the mandated layered approach to PME. Specifically noted in this study were the
curricula at the College ofNaval Command and Staff, the intermediate level course, and
the College ofNaval Warfare, the senior level course, as being too similar to one another.
The panel recommended the Navy distinguish between the two educational levels by
changing the focus of the intermediate course to operational art. In response to the report,
the Navy has since altered the intermediate level course to reflect recommended changes.
However, the nonresident correspondence courses available to both intermediate and
senior level officers remains exactly the same to this date.29
Another Navy study was undertaken by the Naval War College to examine the
feasibility of granting a Master's Degree in conjunction with completion of the Naval War
College. As a result of this study, the Naval War College became the only Service school
authorized to grant a Master's Degree. In 1991, The New England Association of Schools
28 DON, Navy Study Group Report on the Skelton Panel on Military Education,
Washington, DC, November, 1989.
29
U.S. Naval War College, Nonresident Programs Information Guide, GPO,
Newport, RI, 1996.
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and Colleges, Inc. (NEASC) authorized the NWC to grant a Master's Degree in National
Security and Strategic Studies for completion of the intermediate and senior level courses.
Additionally, the NEASC authorized the NWC to grandfather the degree to all Naval War
College graduates dating as far back as 1985. However, today the NWC authority to
grant a Master's Degree only extends to resident completion, and does not extend to the
College of Continuing Education (CCE) for purposes of nonresident Phase I JPME
completion (NWC, 1996). Although, some graduate level credit is awarded for CCE
completion.
There may be some hidden costs associated with the decision to accredit the
NWC. As the previous paragraph pointed out, the Navy was made to change the
intermediate level course. However, the fact that both the intermediate and senior level
courses fulfill the same degree requirements leads this author to suspect the two courses
may still remain largely the same. Any future changes in the NWC courses may prove to
be very difficult, because of the dual constraints imposed on the NWC by both NCEAS
and CJCS accreditation policies. Consequently, Navy JPME may not be quite as flexible
as it needs to be to change with the future tide of technology.
In response to increasing demands for JPME in the Navy, the Naval Postgraduate
School, conducted a feasibility study to determine its ability to provide intermediate level
Phase I JPME in conjunction with select curricula. The study determined this proposal to
be feasible, however, primarily for the National Security Affairs Department curricula.
NPS subsequently applied for Phase I certification of its Joint Education Electives
Program (JEEP) through the CJCS Program for Accreditation of Joint Education
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(PAJE).30 In December 1995, the JEEP was certified as meeting intermediate level Phase
I credit. A follow-on study by the Bureau ofNaval Personnel (PERS-2) found the NPS
JEEP program to have provided a significant increase in the Navy's annual Phase I JPME
production. 31 NPS statistics show annual production of JEEP graduates receiving Phase I
credit during AY-95 and AY-96 increased the Navy's resident Phase I JPME by 1 1 and
23 percent, respectively. 32 Future figures are expected remain at AY-96 levels.
Other JPME related Navy studies include a Master's Thesis by LCDR Peter
Kovach, USN. 33 This particular thesis analyzed the differences in quality between URL
Naval officers completing JDA's as well as those receiving the JSO designation before
and after 1989. His findings showed SWO and NFO officers completing a JDA prior to
1989 had a lower probability of promotion to 0-5. Conversely, SWO's completing a JDA
after 1 October 1989 had a significantly higher probability of promotion to 0-5. He also
found the effect of a JDA on promotion to 0-6 to be statistically insignificant. The effect
of JSO designation on promotion to 0-5 was positive for SWOs and NFOs after 1989.
Lastly, he found the effect of JSO designation on promotion to 0-6 to be positive for
30 Naval Postgraduate School, PAJE Self-Study ofthe NPS "Joint Education
Electives Program", Monterey, CA, September, 1995.
31 Department ofNavy, Advanced Educationfor the Officer Corps, Washington,
DC, April, 1996.
32 Naval Postgraduate School, Joint Education Electives Program Briefing,
Monterey, CA, January, 1997.
33 Kovach, John P., An Analysis ofNaval Officers Serving on Joint Duty: The
Impact ofthe 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, Naval Postgraduate School, Master's Thesis,
March, 1996.
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SWOs and Pilots. Although, these results do not indicate directly the effects ofJPME on
promotion, JPME is a prerequisite for a JDA and JSO designation. Even though this
study focused on an analysis ofJDA completion, the results might actually provide some
indirect measures of quality ofURL Naval officers selected for JPME.
A final Navy JPME related study was conducted by Dr. William Bowman34 of the
U.S. Naval Academy. Although, this study primarily focused on the effects of graduate
education, it is the only study conducted thus far which provides any statistical analysis of
the effects of Service and Joint Service School completion on promotion ofNaval
officers. In his analysis, Dr. Bowman divided JPME into three forms: U.S. Service
schools, foreign Service schools, and Joint Staff schools. Using a PROBIT regression
technique, Dr. Bowman made the following findings: For SWOs completion of Joint
Staff schools provided a significant increase in probability of promotion to 0-5, while any
form of JPME provided a significant increase probability of promotion to 0-6. For
NUCs completion of Service and Joint Staff schools provided a significant increase in
probability of promotion to 0-5, while no form ofJPME provided a significant increase
in probability of promotion to 0-6. For Pilots, Service and Joint Staff school completion
provided a significant increase in probability of promotion to 0-5, while only foreign
Service school completion provided a significant increase in probability of promotion to
0-6. For the NFOs, Joint Staff school completion provided a significant increase in the
34 Bowman, William R., Career Progression ofLine Officers and Graduate
Education in the U.S. Navy, Department ofEconomics, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis,
MD, September 1996.
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probability of promotion to 0-5, while Service school completion provided a significant
increase in the probability of promotion to 0-6. These results provide some general
insight into the positive effects ofJPME across URL communities.
The preceding summary ofJPME related studies has provided some insight into
areas which already have been examined. The results of these studies may be useful in
providing some additional insight into this analysis. The following chapter (Chapter III)
extends the previous discussion of organizational culture by relating it within the context
of the Navy. Additionally, the following chapter provides a summary of the Navy's
interpretation and implementation of CJCS PME/JPME related policies.
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III. THE SURFACE, SUBMARINE, AND AVIATION COMMUNITIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter presented a discussion of Human Capital Theory, which
provides the theoretical foundation for education and training. It then transferred that
theory to the military context by showing some comparisons between various human
capital investments in DON ~ in this case JPME. The last chapter also provided a
comparison/contrast between education and training, which led to a discussion the
intended outcome of these investments ~ organizational culture. Lastly it presented the
CJCS Program ofJPME which was decomposed into its various parts providing a basis
for the model in this analysis. However, the previous chapter failed to address two
questions. These are: (1) What is the organizational culture of the DON? and (1) How
does JPME fit into the context of the DON concerning the URL Naval officer career?
This chapter will address these questions.
B. OVERVIEW
To address these two questions in their entirety is well beyond the scope of this
thesis. However, there have been a number of studies devoted to this particular topic.
One study, in particular, provided an analysis of future career management systems for all
military officers. 35 A second study conducted by the Bureau ofNaval Personnel (PERS-
2) entitled Officer Corps Management in 2000 and Beyond, conducted a bottom-up
35
Thie, Harry, Future Career Management Systemsfor U.S. Military Officers,
RAND (MR-470-OSD), Santa Monica, CA, 1994.
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review of career management in the Navy officer corps. 36 The interim results of this
study provide some insight into the URL Naval officer career for purposes of this
analysis.
The BUPERS study had the effect of clarifying for every Naval officer community
what are considered to be "must have" and "nice to have" assignments in a career.37 By
providing an overview of the competing constraints through the eyes of the PERS-2
study, this analysis is able to shed some light on the issue: How and why does the Navy
determine which officers to select for JPME? To lay the groundwork for the remainder of
the chapter, this analysis provides insight into the organizational culture of the Navy.
C. NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
All military services have well established cultures, which serve to others as their
individual identities. Of all the services, however, some say the Navy has garnered a
reputation as the "independent service." The essence of this belief is found this quote:
The Navy sees itself mainly as an heir to a glorious tradition dating back
to the British navy...If tradition is the altar at which the Navy worships,
then one of the icons on that altar is the concept of independent command
at sea, which is to be sought and honored by every true Naval
officer...Equipped with its own land and air force, the Navy jealously
guards its independence and is happiest left alone. 38
36 Bureau of Naval Personnel (PERS-2), Surface Warfare Officer Career
Progression Briefing, August 14, 1996.
37
Philpott, Tom, The Navy's Pressure Cooker, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
GPO, Washington, DC, May, 1996.
38
Builder, Carl H., The Masks of War, American Military Styles in Strategy and
Analysis, A RAND Corporation Research Study, Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, MD, 1989.
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Whether the Navy is truly deserving of this reputation is not necessarily the
concern here. What is of concern is how the Navy has managed to establish this
reputation. Many point to the Navy's history of being vocal when it comes to the topic of
service unification. 39 Maybe the Navy is the most vocal amongst all the services about
the impact of GNA. However, the driving force behind this response may well lie deep
below the surface ofNavy — down to the roots of service culture.
A previous section of this thesis provided some general insight into organizational
culture. One point conveniently left out from that discussion is that organizational
culture is not necessarily limited to the physical boundaries of the organization.
Organizational culture extends well beyond the physical boundaries and can have an
impact on those outside the organization as well. In effect, organizational culture
influences how outsiders view that organization as a whole. Thus, another liability of
culture can result if outsiders see an organization in a different light from that which the
organization generally perceives itself. The following quote, provides a summary ofhow
one outsider views the DON organization.
All the services make intraservice distinctions among their people,
particularly their officers, on the basis of their specialties or skills. They
differ, however, in how these distinctions are made and used. Therefore,
these distinctions are a useful cue to differences among the services on
what they think is important and what they are about. The Navy is the
most elaborate about its distinctions among, and the relative ranking of, its
various components, branches, or activities. The implicit intraservice
distinctions within the Navy provide an extensive, finely-structured,
39
Builder, Carl H., The Masks of War, American Military Styles in Strategy and
Analysis, A RAND Corporation Research Study, Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, MD, 1989.
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hierarchical pecking order from top to bottom...At the pinnacle of this
structure is the warfare officer. The warriors are most evident among the
younger members of the institution; and they generally leave it to the
institutional fathers to look to the institution's future while they hone their
warrior skills for today...It is apparent from this hierarchy that the
distinctions are made on the basis of what the Navy calls "platforms" the
machines in which the men serve, and their basing. These distinctions
usually divide careers at their beginning; the blending (if any) usually
comes at the 0-6 level; in between, few cross over from one career
(platform) path to another. The Navy supports the notion that every
(unrestricted) line officer is a potential candidate for the Navy's top job,
the Chief ofNaval Operations (CNO). Therefore, the hierarchy in career
specializations can be associated with the experience relevant to the
management of the total Navy. Consequently, there are factions in the
Navy too isolated from the mainstream of operations (such as the SSNs)
who will never have the chance to become CNO. (Builder, 1989)
Is the Navy deserving of this type of broad generalization? The fact remains,
however, that this is how one outsider views the DON organization. This illustration
serves as one example ofhow organizational culture can actually become a liability. It's
obvious that (Builder, 1989) doesn't see the Navy the way the Navy sees itself.
The Navy considers itself to be different from the other services. Different in that
the Navy is called upon to perform its strategic mission on a daily basis. Whereas, the
other services do not operate in this same manner. They are referred to by some with the
term "garrison services." That is, they wait in garrison for the call to respond, while the
Navy maintains constant vigil operating on the front line. This is why, the proverbial
brass ring in any URL Naval officer's career is command of a warfighting unit ~
"command at sea." However, one advantage of command at sea is that is also brings with
it the ability to operate over the horizon with little intervention ~ under the context of
doctrine this is referred to as operating under commander's intent.
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Just mention the word "joint" and the hairs on the neck of every command
aspiring Naval officer begin to raise, because to a real Naval officer "joint" means loss of
independence. In essence, loss of command. Therefore, a joint assignment for a real
Naval officer is something to be avoided like the plague. This attitude is evident in a
recent tongue-in-cheek article published in Proceedings. Evident is the disdain for "joint"
an attitude which this author refers to as the "Da Rita Syndrome."40
With the "Da Rita Syndrome" fully ingrained in their minds every true Naval
officer approaches his/her career in the building-block manner. Each operational
assignment builds on the previous one. Every assignments should contribute directly to
professional development of the warfighting skills. In fact, some shore duty assignments
don't even count. Is there no time built into a career for anything else? But what about
the all important human capital investments ofJPME and GRADE ED? Do these take a
back seat to URL community assignments? Is this the Navy overemphasis of the warrior
that (Builder, 1989) tries to warn everyone about.
Builder can't be that far off base, because others have recently come to the same
conclusion. In fact, the Navy's supposed over-emphasis on the "warrior" concept was
recently blamed for leading the organization into a period of suboptimal performance.
One author in particular characterizes the Navy "warrior" as having gone too far in this
regard. In his recent book, Gregory Vistica,41 noted author suggests some Navy
40 Da Rita, Lawrence, LCDR, USNR, / Went Joint (But I Didn't Inhale), U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1993.
41 Gregory L. Vistica, Fall From Glory, Simon/Schuster, New York, NY, 1995.
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"warriors" were allowed to go too far, resulting in the Tailhook scandal. While other
warriors tried to cover it up. Supporting or refuting Mr. Vistica's comments is well
beyond the scope of this analysis. However, this author thought it is necessary to make
mention to provide some food for though. With that in mind, this analysis sets a course
toward providing additional insight into the URL Naval officer career paths — the same
officers that (Builder, 1989 and Vistica, 1996) affectionately refer to as "warriors."
D. URL OFFICER CAREER PATHS
Copies of the Surface Warfare (SWO), Nuclear (NUC) and Aviation (Pilot and
NFO) Officer career paths are provided in Appendices B,42 C,43 and D. 44 These matrices
of assignments provide structure to a URL officer's career. Although, there are a
multitude of assignment combinations URL officers might successfully follow during the
course of a career, these career paths provide an suitable framework from which to
manage their careers.
The introduction to this chapter mentioned the PERS-2 career management study
was successful in focusing on these career paths and determining "must have" and "nice
to have" assignments throughout a career. The following list summarizes those "must
have" assignments (Kusumoto, 1997, Struble, 1997, Ryan, 1997, Phillpot 1996):
42 CDR Kusumoto, USN, Surface Warfare Officer Community Manager,
(BUPERS-21 1 W), Washington, DC, January 1997.
43 CDR Struble, USN, Nuclear Officer Community Manager, (BUPERS-21 IN),
Washington, DC, January 1997.
44 CAPT Ryan, USN, Naval Aviation Officer Community Manager, (BUPERS-





3. Department Head Tour
4. Executive Officer (XO) Tour45
5. Commanding Officer (CO) Tour
6. Joint / Professional Military Education
7. Joint Duty Assignment
8. Major Command Tour
9. Washington, DC Tour
1 0. Operational / Headquarters Staff Tour
On the other hand, the following list summarizes those "nice to have" assignments
within a URL career (Kusimoto, 1997, Struble, 1997, Ryan, 1997, Phillpot 1996):
1 Shore tour as a Junior Officer
2. Subspecialty utilization tour
3. More than one Washington Headquarters or Joint Tour
4. Longer Captain and Flag Careers
Completing all the assignments contained on this list of "must haves" proves to be
somewhat of a daunting challenge, especially for the average officer. Any one of these
"must have" assignments takes substantial time to complete. However, the training and
45 Separate XO and CO assignments are applicable only to SWOs and NUCs. For
the aviation community (Pilot and NFO) XO and CO tours are completed sequentially.
Therefore, screening for both XO and CO in aviation is completed at the same time.
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education provided during these "must have" tours is necessary for the professional
development of an officer. Any one of the "must have" assignments left out at a critical
point in a career could potentially stifle future chances of promotion. Add to these
constraints additional ones imposed by GNA making some of these assignments
mandatory for promotion to G/FO, and managing the careers of those top officers often
referred to as a "fast-trackers" proves to be difficult.
There are costs and benefits an officer must weigh when considering every
assignment. GRAD ED, JPME, and JDA have often been referred to as time away from
community-specific URL training considered essential for promotion. For this very
reason, there may be somewhat of a tendency to shy away from these assignments. For
some officers, this is an effective and efficient means of career management.
The previous chapter summarized a number of studies, showing the important
contributions these investments can make if managed properly throughout a career. This
point brings to the forefront the question: How are human capital investments in URL
Naval officer careers managed in the Navy? In particular: How are officers selected for
the investment ofJPME? The following section provides a summary ofNavy policies
concerning the current JPME screening, selection and assignment processes.
E. NAVY APPROACH TO JPME
1. JPME Policy Sources and Objectives
To manage the careers ofURL Naval officers, the Navy has labored to establish a
number of policies concerning various types of assignments. The Navy considers JPME
to be a significant human capital investment in the career of a URL officer.
50
Consequently, specific policies have been developed to address the topic of selection and
assignment. The Navy's current selection and assignment processes for JPME are derived
from a number of different sources, which include the following documents:
1
.
Naval Officer Professional Development Study (DON, 1974)
2. Technical Competence / Education of the Officer Corps Study.46
3. Advanced Education for the Officer Corps Study.47
4. Chief ofNaval Operations Service College Education Policy48
5. Naval Officer's Career Planning Guidebook (1990 Edition)49
6. Service School Selection Procedures. 50
7. Service College Administrative Screening Procedures51
8. Navy Federal Executive Fellowship Program Procedures. 52
46 Reference to this study is made in the following memorandum: Chief ofNaval
Operations, Memorandum for the Chief ofNaval Personnel, Technical Competence /
Education of the "Future" Officer Corps, Washington, DC, May 15, 1996.
47 Bureau ofNaval Personnel (PERS 2), Memorandum, Advanced Educationfor
the Officer Corps, Washington, DC, April, 3 1996.
48 Chief of Naval Operations, Service College Education Policy, GPO,
Washington, DC, May 19, 1989.
49 Department ofNavy, The Naval Officer's Career Planning Guidebook,
NAVPERS 15605, GPO, Washington, DC, 1990.
50 Department ofNavy, Service School Selection and Assignment Procedures,
OPNAVINST 1301.8, GPO, Washington, DC, 1984.
51 Bureau ofNaval Personnel, PERS-440C, Service College Administrative
Screening Procedures, GPO, Washington, DC, April 12, 1993.
52 Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Federal Executive Fellowship Program,
OPNAVINST 1500.72B, GPO, Washington, DC, January 23, 1996.
51
9. Naval Military Personnel Manual Section 66201 30. 53
10. Naval Postgraduate School Catalog54
1 1
.
United States Naval War College Catalog55
These formal Navy documents all cover various aspects of JPME, ranging from
analyses to selection and assignment procedures. Upon careful examination of these
documents, one finds the Navy's formal interpretation of the goal ofJPME to be:
The goal of (J)PME is to enhance an officer's capacity to
discharge responsibilities associated with high level
command and staff positions within the armed forces.
Attendance is considered a significant milestone in the
professional development of a Naval officer. (DON, 1990)
This interpretation predates recent changes in CJCS JPME policy found in the
1996 OPMEP (CJCS, 1996). Even though, one may think it wrong to judge the Navy's
policies based on past documents, they may serve to explain the Navy's current approach
to JPME in a URL career. In fact, since the primary Navy instructions on Service school
selection and CNO's policy on JPME have not been updated since 1984 and 1989,
respectively, some might be inclined to conclude there has not been a significant shift in
Navy philosophy toward JPME, in spite of what the OPMEP might otherwise say.
53 Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel Manual, NAVPERS
15560C, GPO, Washington, DC, October 1991.
54 Naval Postgraduate School, Student Course Catalogue, Monterey, CA, 1996.




Figure 5 is intended as an aid to the following discussion on JPME policy
formulation and implementation. Figure 5 shows JPME policy starts at the very top of
the organization with execution of the CNO's Policy statement, establishing the Navy's
overall objectives for JPME. Next, the Chief ofNaval Education and Training (OPNAV
N-7) is responsible for overall coordination of education policy, including JPME. The
responsibility for implementing JPME policy concerning personnel matters rests squarely
between two divisions in the Bureau ofNaval Personnel. These divisions include the
Assistant Chief ofNaval Personnel for Military Personnel Policy and Career Progression
(PERS 2) and the Assistant Chief ofNaval Personnel for Distribution (PERS 4).
CNO
OPNAVN7 BUPERS
NWC NPS PERS-2 PERS-4
NWC - Naval War College
NPS - Naval Postgraduate School
PERS
2JJ/455
Figure 5. Organization ofNavy JPME Policy Formulation and Implementation.
53
Turning first to a discussion of their responsibilities, one can see that PERS-2 is
responsible for developing and issuing military personnel plans and policies, and
monitoring adherence to ensure attainment of fiscal and end strength objectives. PERS-4
is responsible for implementing policies pertaining to officer and enlisted assignments,
placement, retention, career enhancement and motivation, and career progression.
Providing a link between PERS-2 and PERS-4 on JPME is the Special Assistant for Joint
Matters (PERS-2JJ/455). PERS-2JJ/455 is responsible for coordinating, developing and
implementing personnel polices pertaining to joint matters. These responsibilities
include: developing the annual JPME Quota Plan (Service School and Joint Service
School), in addition to monitoring and reviewing officers assigned to JPME and JDAs in
an overall effort to maintain compliance with the Title X personnel requirements of GNA.
3. JPME Quota Plan
PERS-45 5 is specifically charged with producing the annual Navy JPME Quota
Plan. This process includes determining quotas for Service Schools (JPME I), Joint
Service Schools (JPME II) and some JPME equivalents. The following comments
highlight a number of issues PERS-455 considers when crafting the JPME Quota Plan. 56
The level and distribution ofJPME quotas cannot be justified solely on the
basis of graduates required to fill specific joint billets. If JPME were
viewed only as a "joint duty assignment training track" the requirement for
JPME would be about 213 officers per year. Such an approach is
unreasonable.
56
Faber, Jerry, CDR, PERS-2JJ, Point Paper on War College Student
Quota/Funding Mismatch, Washington, DC, May 30, 1995.
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Lower quotas would require all officers who attend JPME to be locked
into a follow-on tour, which would, when combined with the JPME, take
them away from Navy assignments for up to four years ~ the precise time
in their career when they should be in Navy command assignments.
Additionally, there is a benefit in sending some additional officers to
JPME even though their communities are exempt from legal requirements
in GNA for JPME.
The law (GNA) requires a minimum ratio of students from all services in
each of the Service schools. Those quotas are currently at the minimum
level necessary to allow the service schools to meet the student service
mix required by law. The "required" level of quotas to support non-Navy
schools is currently about 1 90/yr.
The previous comments highlight the fact that if it weren't for JPME requirements
mandated by GNA, there might be a lot less Naval Officers assigned to complete JPME.
Therefore, it is plain to see the requirements ofGNA actually drive the Quota Plan. To
effectively manage quotas, PERS-455 has developed the following Quota Model as a tool
to determine the annual number of billets required to maintain compliance with GNA.
Figure 6 shows the three primary factors taken into consideration by the PERS-455 Quota
Model are:
1. JDALSize;
2 Critical JDAL Billets;
3. Percent detailed to Phase II JPME and JDA.
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Figure 6. JPME Quota Plan Model. From (PERS-455, 1 997).
Figure 6 shows a total of 460 JPME quotas were required to meet the 1995 JDAL
requirements — 40 extra were quotas thrown in to provide an added measure of comfort.
This illustrates why the quota plan remains consistently at a level of 500 JPME quotas. In
effect, the plan provides quotas for all Service Schools (Phase I), Joint Schools (Phase II
and Phase I / II) and Foreign Service Colleges (Phase I). However, it does not provide
quotas for the Navy Federal Executive Fellowship Program. This program is handled by
OPNAV N3/N5, and will be addressed in a separate section.
Figure 7 is a depiction of the increase in number of Service School quotas and
fills during the period of 1986 to 1996. 57 One important point to note from this figure is
57 LT Jamie Counter, Service College Attendance, Washington, DC, January 1997.
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the marked increase in Service School quotas starting in 1988, followed by a leveling off
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Figure 7. Service College Attendance. From (PERS-440C, 1997).
Once PERS-455 has established the quota plan, the quotas are divided amongst
the various communities based on predetermined ratios. For FY96, the distribution of
Service school quotas between URL and restricted line/staff corps (RL/Staff)
communities remained constant from previous levels set at 75% URL and 25%
RL/STAFF for senior level courses and 71% URL and 29% RL/Staff for Intermediate
level courses. For the Joint Service Schools each community is provided its fair share of
quotas based on its percentage of billet requirements of the JDAL. 58 Table 3.1 depicts the
actual enrollment in the Service and Joint schools for the ten year between FY87 and
58 Email from LCDR Alan Grace, PERS-455B/2JJ, February 5, 1997.
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FY96. 59 This figure shows the minimum levels required by law to maintain the student
service mix within the other service schools.





















NWC 95 99 98 101 100 111 125 105 102 114
NCSC 97 83 84 106 110 142 165 163 162 168
ICAF 40 40 39 39 40 40 40 43 43 43
NATL 28 28 28 27 28 28 28 30 29 29
USAWC 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 7 10
USAGCS 3 8 8 10 39 49 60 60 45 45
AWC 10 10 9 11 15 16 15 15 14 15
ACSC 4 11 11 25 35 34 35 35 35 35
MCWAR - - - - 1 1 1 1 2 2
USMCSC 9 12 12 23 24 24 24 25 25 25
FOR 20 17 17 15 19 17 20 15 20 14
SIWS - - - - - - - 3 i -
TOTAL 314 316 314 365 419 470 521 504 487 500
* FY95 BASED ON QUOTAPLA]SI
SOURCE: Joint Officer Management Brief, PERS-455, January 1997.
It was mentioned earlier, one form of JPME not accounted for by the PERS-455
JPME Quota Plan is the Navy Federal Executive Fellowship (FEF) Program. Therefore,
this program is omitted from the summary in Table 3.1. The reason for this omission?
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1997.
PERS-455, Navy Joint Officer Management Briefing, Washington, DC, January,
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Quota management for this program is handled by OPNAV N3/N5, and selection is by
Administrative Board requiring a separate application process. The officers graduating
from this program throughout its history have been few in number. However, these
officers have been granted Phase I (intermediate or senior level) credit. As of 1997,
Phase I credit will no longer be awarded for completion of the FEF intermediate
programs. In addition, as of 1999, Phase I credit will no longer be awarded for
completion of the FEF senior programs. In light of this development, the FEF Program
will not be covered in the following section concerning selection processes.
4. JPME Selection Processes
Selection for Service and Joint Service schools consists of two distinct and
separate processes. Service school selection is conducted by Administrative Board
procedures. Joint Service School selection is conducted in a totally different fashion —
the driving force behind Joint Service School selection, particularly for AFSC, is
assignment to a JDA. The following section highlights the differences between these
unique approaches to selection.
a. Service School (Phase I) Selection
There are two types of boards held within BUPERS. These boards
include: Administrative and Statutory. Administrative Boards make selections once
made by committees or by detailer action not otherwise governed by law, whereas,
Statutory Boards are selection processes specifically governed by law. A Promotion
Board is one example of Statutory Board. The following paragraphs taken from
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Perspective Magazine include a detailed description of each of these type of boards. This
description is intended to show the applicability of Boards to the JPME selection
process.60
Statutory promotion boards are comprised of several steps. One of the
final steps is the selection phase. During the selection phase, all officer
records are briefed to board members in a room called the "Tank" (a
private, theater-like room). Candidates for promotion can be from any one
of three categories, including: above-zone (late), in-zone (on time), and
below-zone (early). In the tank all members discuss and vote on
candidates. During the voting process, each board member uses a "secret
ballot" computer keypad located on the arm of their seats to vote a
confidence level for the selection of the candidate. Each member can vote
either 100% (the member is 100 percent sure the candidate should be
selected), 75%, 50%, 25%, or 0% (the candidate should NOT be selected).
After all the votes are cast, a computer in the tank combines them into a
overall confidence rating, which is then displayed as a percentage on a
monitor for all members to see.
The confidence rating of each candidate is recorded and then all
candidates are ranked according to their assigned rating after all the
records have been reviewed. The board president then selects a number of
the records from the top scorers to be "tentatively selected." The president
will propose this selection as a motion to the entire board. The board
either votes on the motion or members offer counter proposals.
Whichever proposal is accepted, it is accepted by a majority vote of all the
members. This same scenario is repeated when the board attempts to
determine which number of the bottom scoring candidates should be
"dropped from further contention."
All the candidates between the "selected" and "dropped" scores are re-
reviewed in the tank. These candidates receive another confidence rating
and the process starts over again. Several tank sessions are usually
required before the board comes up with the number of candidates who are
best qualified for promotion.
60 Department ofNavy, Perspective Magazine, GPO, Washington, DC, January
February 1997.
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Unlike the promotion process, the Service college screening process is completed
by administrative board action following completion of the annual statutory 0-4, 0-5,
and 0-6 promotion boards. The following board procedures were described to this author
concerning the JPME Administrative Selection Board (Counter, 1997):
Thefinal confidence levels assigned to officers during the 0-4 and 0-5
statutory promotion boards are used to provide an overall ranking of
candidates for the JPME Administrative Selection Board. At the 0-4 and
0-5 levels, those officers selected for JPME consist of the top 50% of the
in-zone promotees and 100% of the below-zone promotees using those
confidence ratings from the Statutory Board. At the 0-6 level, all officers
selected for promotion are selected for JPME.
Since the service college administrative board essentially piggy-backs the
Statutory Promotion Board, in reality, the Navy doesn't necessarily conduct a separate
board to select its officers for JPME. However, all the other services actually go to great
lengths to convene separate boards to determine which officers they select for JPME. 61
b. Joint Service School (Phase II) Selection
Previous reference was made to the selection process for Joint Service
schools being different than the selection process just described for Service Schools. The
following direction was provided to PERS-455 by the PERS-4 Division Head concerning
Joint Service School selection. It highlights the current process for selection to JPME II.
The focus on JPME Phase II has always been to send the "right" officers to
AFSC to complete their joint education. The right officer is he/she who
can benefit the most from receiving the training. Numerous Military
61 Koran, John G., Manpower Managementfor Joint Specialty Officers: A
Comparative Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA,
December 1990.
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Education Coordination Conference (MECC)62 working groups have
convened over the past 4 months, chaired by JCS Jl, with the expressed
(sic) purpose of exploring joint training, doctrine and education. At each
meeting, the point has been made the CINC's "are not happy with gapped
billets related to officers receiving Phase II." To combat this problem, all
services must "improve the service personnel assignment process and
Phase II timing." The strict interpretation of this is to capture them
enroute to the joint tour vice (sic) pulling them out TAD for 3 months.
Our placement process focuses on exactly this, send them enroute to their
PCS orders to their first Joint tour. It's the right thing to do for two
reasons, first we get our Navy officers fully funded joint education prior to
walking in the door to work for the CINC, and second, it maximizes our
opportunity to ensure compliance with Title 10 requirements to ensure a
minimum of 37.5 % of the JDAL is filled by JSO's or JSO nominees with
JPME. Based on these requirements, seating priority (for AFSC) follows:
Pri 1 63 - PCS enroute to overseas Joint assignment
Pri 2 - PCS enroute to CONUS Joint assignments
Pri 3 - TAD and return from a Joint assignment (within first year)
Pri 4 - TAD and return from a Joint assignment (second-third year)
Pri 5 - PCS enroute non-joint assignments
Pri 6 - TAD and return from non-joint assignments
These preceding comments reveal the Phase II selection process is primarily




2. Previous completion of Phase I JPME.
3 Assignment to a JDA.
62 Guidance for the MECC working group is provided by CJCS in the OPMEP.
The OPMEP states "The MECC addresses key educational issues, coordinates the overall
joint educational effort and examines and evaluates the Program for Joint Education
(PJE) objectives.
63 The term Pri cannot be found in any JCS document. It is another way of saying
Priority levels, which is a BUPERS method of setting precedence levels for billet
assignments. In this case, AFSC JPME II, receives different placement priority levels.
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The JPME selection process is not necessarily considered complete at the end of
the administrative screening process. The previous section intimated there is a continued
concern about future promotability even after an officer has been assigned to JPME. The
following section details the procedures put in place to monitor for future promotability
of officers prior to and during attendance of JPME.
5. JPME Placement Processes
Although, the Administrative Screening Board provides data on those officers
eligible for JPME an additional screening mechanism is necessary. To monitor for future
promotability, in 1993 PERS-4, directed the addition of Service College Administrative
Screening Procedures. The Service College Administrative Screening Procedure "serves
as a complement to the service college pre-screening selection board process.. .and.. .is
required for all Senior course nominees, and those Junior course nominees up for
promotion while attending service college." 64 Inputs to the Administrative screening
process come directly from the individual officer as well as the officer's warfare
community. In effect, this administrative procedure provides an additional screening
mechanism to constantly monitor officer personal preferences, promotion potential, as
well as warfare community desirability. These redundant administrative procedures have
apparently been put in place, because JPME is an significant investment in a career. As
with most investments there is some kind of payback, which is seen in the next section.
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Natter, R.J., RADM, USN, ACNP for Distribution, Distribution Guidance
Memorandum # 04-93, Service College Administrative Screening Procedures,
Washington, DC, April 12, 1993.
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6. JPME Payback Tour Requirements
The overall time required to complete most Service schools is approximately ten
months. One exception includes some Foreign Service Schools which require an
additional language school enroute to attendance. As part of the process CJCS reviews
and promulgates an approved list of the Phase I Service Schools and their equivalents. 65
An officer who completes any one of the Service schools or their equivalents incurs a one
year service payback requirement upon completion of the school (i.e., a 1:1 payback
ratio). Again, some Foreign Service Schools serve as an exception to this rule, requiring
upwards of a three year payback tour to be performed with the respective Foreign Service
(e.g., Canada) upon completion of their service school.
Payback for Joint Service Schools consists of, in most cases, a three year JDA
assignment. In most cases, those officers attending the three month JPME Phase II course
do so enroute to a three year JDA afterwards. However, in very rare instances officers are
assigned to a JPME Phase II quota without assignment to a follow-on JDA. The only
exception in this case occurs when an officer has completed a JDA and returns to
complete JPME afterward enroute to full JSO designation. For an officer to complete
JPME II without assignment to a follow-on JDA requires submission of a Service waiver
containing strong justification for CJCS approval.
65 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Programfor Joint Education Phase Equivalent
Credit, Memorandum, Washington, DC, September 11, 1996.
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F. JPME IN THE NAVY AS COMPARED TO OTHER SERVICES
The Navy has been suspect in its conviction toward JPME. One official to
question the Navy's resolve is this regard is former Representative Ike Skelton. He did so
publicly during a series of House Armed Services Committee Congressional Hearings
held on PME.66 Others have questioned the Navy's commitment to providing quality
officers to JPME. RADM Stark, President of the Naval War College, provided a number
of statements showing the apparent lack of quality ofNaval officers sent to JPME. A
1996 memorandum from RADM Stark to the CNO stated, "While all of the students
work hard, it has been clear for some time the average performance of the Navy officers
here is significantly lower than that of the other service representatives." To illustrate this
point, RADM Stark used the following slide during a recent briefing on PME. 67
66 House of Representatives, Hearings on Professional Military Education,
Committee on Armed Services, H.A.S.C. No. 100-125, GPO, Washington, DC, 1990.
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Figure 8. Naval War College Distinguished Graduates 1986 - 1995. From (NWC, 1996).
This slide shows the percentage of Distinguished Graduates amongst Naval
Officers graduating from the Naval War College is significantly lower than that of the
other services — for both the intermediate and senior level courses. A previous section
showed the other services actually convene separate administrative boards to determine
which officers it sends to JPME. This formal selection process may have something to
do with the "Distinguished Graduate" phenomenon RADM Stark describes. However, an
alternative hypothesis might be that the added benefit of a graduate degree from attending
the NWC makes that much more appealing to other Service members. This situation may
cause other Service officers to compete for the NWC, resulting in higher quality officers.
A number of options have been provided as possible solutions to increasing the
quality and number ofNaval officers completing JPME. RADM Stark suggests, just like
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the other services, making the completion ofJPME a requirement for promotion. To
effect this suggestion, RADM Stark has recommended the following changes to help
increase JPME quality and completion within the Navy: 68
1
.
Increase attendance at the Service Colleges.
2. Restructure NWC Correspondence Course.
3. Restructure Nonresident Seminar Course.
On the surface these suggestions seem like plausible solutions, especially since
the NWC Correspondence Course was recently shortened in length to two years.69 In
addition the NWC Nonresident Seminar Program has recently undergone revision. 70
However, there are several questions that still need answers: (1) How many Naval
officers are completing other Service School nonresident courses, and why? (2) Now that
a shortened version of the NWC Correspondence Course is being offered, how many
more Naval officers will complete this version? Tables 3.2 and 3.3, show enrollment in
the various Service school correspondence and nonresident seminar courses as of January
1997. These statistics were reported by individual Service school Continuing Education
68
Stark, J. R., RADM, USN, Memorandum for the ChiefofNaval Operations
Vice ChiefofNaval Operationsfrom President War College, Newport, RI, October 11,
1995.
69 U.S. Naval War College, Nonresident Programs Information Guide, Newport,
RI, 1996.
70 Phone conversation with Professor Timothy Jackson, Deputy Director,
Continuing Education Department, Naval War College, Newport, RI, January 1997.
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Department personnel to this author. 71 They are intended to show the existing demand
for all Service School JPME Correspondence Courses throughout the military officer
corps. They are also intended to show the possible existence of competition between
Service Schools in this area.
Table 3.2. Service School Correspondence Course Enrollment By Service
SERVICE CGSC NWC ACSC USMC TOTAL
ARMY 3565 7 37 86 3695
NAVY 17 178 138 19 352
AIR FORCE 41 15 2386 33 2475
MARINE 6 37 10 1052 1105
COAST GUARD 6 44 2 52
RESERVE 3324 161 2009 867 6361
CIVILIAN 103 16 301 11 431
FOREIGN 2 36 38
TOTAL 7058 456 4925 2070 14509
SOURCE: U.S. Service Schools' Continuing Education Offices, January 1997
71 Source of Correspondence Course and Seminar Enrollment provided by:
(a) Phone conversation with Ms. Kathy Wagner, Chief of Student Correspondence
Services, Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS, January 1997.
(b) Phone conversation with Mr. Kevin Purvis, Education Advisor, Department of
Continuing Education, Naval War College, Newport, RI, January, 1997.
(c) Phone conversation with Ms. Sheila Gordon, Distance Learning Department, Air
Command and Staff College, Montgomery, Alabama, January, 1997.
(d) Phone conversation with LtCol Sean Connolly, USMC, Department of Continuing
Education, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, January, 1997.
Note: USMC does not offer separate courses, so enrollment shown is identical.
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Table 3.3. Service School Non-Resident Seminar Enrollment by Service.
SERVICE CGSC NWC ACSC MCCSC TOTAL
ARMY 345 9 23 86 463
NAVY 11 277 66 19 373
AIR FORCE 3 11 1233 33 1280
MARINE 6 37 10 1052 1105
COAST GUARD 25 2 27
RESERVE 1349 213 321 867 2750
CIVILIAN 127 343 11 481
FOREIGN 3 3
TOTAL 1714 702 1996 2070 6482
SOURCE: U.S. Service Schools' Continuing Education Offices, January 1997
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show a significant number of Army and Air Force officers
completing nonresident JPME as compared to the other services. This figure includes
correspondence and seminar. Indirectly, these figures show the emphasis these two
services place on completing JPME. Another interesting statistic is the number ofNaval
officers completing the Air Force correspondence course. There are a total of 138 Naval
Officers completing the ACSC Force course, which is almost as many as the 178
completing the NWC Course. The reason for this disparity could be twofold72 :
1
.
18 month length ofACSC Correspondence Course
2. CD-ROM Format ofACSC Correspondence Course
72 Air Command and Staff College, Distance Learning Programs Brochure,
Maxwell, AFB, AL, January, 1997.
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One demonstration of the demand for JPME in the Naval officer corps was
highlighted by a survey ofNaval Postgraduate School (NPS) students conducted in
December 1994. In this particular survey, the NPS students' primary professional
development concern was JPME. 73 These facts indicate there is a demand for JPME
amongst Naval officers. At this point in the analysis two additional questions bear
mention: Is the competition for this demand being won by the Air Force and the Army?
How best can the Navy better meet the demand for JPME? Although relevant, these
questions are beyond the scope of this analysis, and are best left for a separate analysis.
One possible method to address the demand that RADM Stark recommends is by
increasing attendance at the Service Schools. In response to RADM Stark's proposal,
VADM Bowman, Chief ofNaval Personnel, offered the following comments in a 1995
memorandum to VADM Tracey, Chief ofNaval Education and Training (N-7).
"Expanding the number of officers attending these courses beyond the levels currently
supported will require a change in both our philosophy and our funding of (joint)
professional military education. From student billets in an already under-funded
individuals account to community-unique career path impact, our analysis of this issue
will have to address the comprehensive approach to both (joint) professional military
education and professional development education." 74
73 Naval Postgraduate School, Student Survey on JPME, Monterey, CA,
December, 1994.
74 Bowman, F. L. VADM, USN, Chief of Naval Personnel), Memorandumfor the
Director ofNaval Training (N7), October 1995.
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The Navy's philosophical approach to JPME in the broader context of personnel
management is readily apparent in view ofVADM Bowman comment ~ with the
consequences of this philosophy having a number of possible effects on the Navy officer
corps. RADM Stark provided yet another slide during the same PME briefing to show
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Figure 9. Current G/FO PME Completion. From (NWC, 1996).
Figure 9 shows the current PME completion percentages of all General / Flag
Officers (G/FOs) from all four Services. The Navy is depicted with the lowest
completion percentages of all the Services ~ with only 33 percent of all current Navy
G/FO's having completed one-step PME, and only 8 percent having completed two-step
PME — compared to the other services G/FOs showing almost 1 00 percent completion in
both areas. In light of this last statistic, one might reasonably be justified in pointing to
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the Navy's philosophical approach to JPME as one possible reason for its significant
disparity in G/FOs with two-step PME.
At this point two related questions merit concern: Has the Navy's philosophical
approach to JPME hampered the ability of the Navy officer to compete in the joint arena?
If it has, then how might the Navy begin to alter its philosophical tendencies? The
manner in which the Navy reacts to this challenge plays an important role in shaping the
future, especially as it enters an era of increasing technological dependence ~ an era
which has been characterized a "Revolution in Military Affairs." 75
CJCS Joint Vision 20 1076 suggests one possible method for the Navy to maintain
its competitive edge in the joint arena is through a continuum of JPME. The remainder of
this study sets out to explore a small part of that continuum and the effect it has had on
the URL Navy officer corps. As a means of determining this effect, the next chapter,
Chapter IV, is devoted to a description of the data used in this analysis.
75
Galdi, Theodor W., Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts,
Organizational Responses, Outstanding Issues, Foreign Affairs and National Defense
Division, Washington, DC, November 30, 1995.
76 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC, June 1996.
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. DATA
This study concerning the effects ofJPME on the URL Naval officer career
employs three different data files constructed by combining a number of Department of
Navy administrative files. These three files contain data on all officers considered for
promotion at the 0-4, 0-5 and 0-6 Promotion Boards during Fiscal Years 1986 through
1994. Of primary interest to this study are the subset of Unrestricted Line (URL) officers
bearing warfare designations in the surface (1110), submarine (1 120), aviation (pilot
(1310) and naval flight officer (1320)) communities.
The overall term for the type of file structure used in this study has been referred
to in past studies as a "longitudinal-retrospective file."
77
This term implies two different
connotations. First, it implies an approximation technique similar to that used in "cohort
analysis." 78 This technique proves important when making comparisons of the effect of
treatments after various periods of time. To be considered valid, the effects of any
treatment should be compared between the same group of individuals receiving that
original treatment. In the case of this analysis, comparing the effects ofJPME (the
77 Bowman, William, Career Progression ofLine Officers and Graduate
Education in the U.S. Navy, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, September, 1996.
78 Cohort analysis is performed by using a longitudinal data set of a "cohort" of
individuals beginning at a particular point in time ~ a snapshot. Over time the same
cohort is followed and different snapshots of outcomes taken for each individual. This
technique allows the measurement of different effects across the cohort as a result of
similar experiences over time.
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treatment) should also be done for the same cohort of individuals at the same time.
Second, this term implies the ability to look backward over time. The ability to look back
over time is important to this analysis, because it provides multiple opportunities to view
different outcomes as a function of previous events. In the case of this analysis, it is
important to determine whether different forms of human capital investments were
undertaken, and at what times they were undertaken in a career. A "longitudinal-
retrospective file" provides a suitable fit for this type of analysis.
The ability to access different data elements is also important to the effectiveness
of this analysis. Therefore, three separate aggregated files were formed for officers at the
0-4, 0-5, and 0-6 promotion boards by merging six different files. These files include:
1
.
Navy Officer Promotion History Files
2. Navy Officer Master File (OMF)
3 Navy Officer Data Card (ODC)
4. Navy Fitness Report (FITREP) Files79
5. Navy Unit Identification Code (UIC) File
6. Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) File80
Various data elements were taken from these five files, which provided the data
for analysis in this Thesis. The Navy Officer Promotion History Files provides
79 FITREP File provided by the Navy Personnel Research and Development
(NPRDC) Command, San Diego, CA.
80 JDAMIS File provided by Ms. Dawn de long, Defense Manpower Data Center
(East), Arlington, VA.
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information pertaining to promotion outcomes. The Navy Officer Master File (OMF)
provides information pertaining to individual officer demographics, such as marital status
and commissioning source and date. The Navy Officer Data Card (ODC) and Officer
Master (OMF) Files both provide information pertaining to pre-commissioning and post-
commissioning military education, training, experience and qualifications. The Navy
Fitness Report (FITREP) File provides specific performance appraisal information of an
officer by his/her reporting senior. The Navy Unit Identification Code (UIC) File provides
valuable information pertaining to officer command assignment history not otherwise
found in the OMF and ODC. Lastly, the Joint Duty Assignment Information (JDAMIS)
File81 provides information pertaining to Joint Duty Assignment (JDA), Joint Professional
Military Education (JPME) and Joint Qualification Data. This file supported similar
existing information also found in the OMF.
The three data files were manipulated and analyzed using SAS 82 Statistical
Application Software on the IBM83 mainframe computer at the Naval Postgraduate
School. SAS proved particularly useful in this endeavor because of the large volume of
data required to be manipulated when initially merging and sorting these six files. In
addition, the use of SAS proved beneficial when manipulating data elements of the
resulting 0-4, 0-5 and 0-6 Promotion Board files, because it was necessary to combine a
81 Defense Manpower Data Center Profile, Defense Manpower Data Center,
Seaside, CA, 1996.
82 SAS refers to Statistical Applications Software Institute, Inc., Cary, NC.
83 IBM refers to International Business Machines Corporation, Armonk, NY.
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number of existing variables. The techniques involved in combining variables relevant to
this analysis are discussed in a latter section.
B. DATA AND THE CJCS JPME MODEL
The major relationships in the CJCS JPME Model consist of: level, phase and
source. At this point it is important to relate these distinctions in a manner such that the
data can support the analysis. The levels, phases and sources of the CJCS JPME
framework depicted in Figure 4, is slightly complicated for this discussion, and, therefore,
requires further simplification to support this analysis. Simplification is done by focusing
on the sources of JPME. There were several commonalities that can be established
between these sources. These include Resident for the Service Schools, Nonresident for
the Correspondence and Seminar Courses, and Equivalents for the Federal Executive
Fellowship Program and the Foreign War Colleges. For purposes of simplification, these
distinctions will be used in this analysis. In so doing, it becomes necessary to further
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Figure 10. Simplification of CJCS JPME Framework.
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Like figure 4, figure 10 also shows two levels ofJPME - intermediate and senior.
However, the sources of have been further combined where the aforementioned
commonalities occur. Separate distinctions for the intermediate and senior levels still
exist for Resident Phase I JPME. However, Equivalent Phase I (Federal Executive
Fellowship and Foreign Service Colleges), Nonresident Phase I and Phase II JPME have
all been combined for these two levels. Like the Service college residents, Phase I / II
sources remain separated for the intermediate and senior levels.
Previous studies have attempted to analyze the effects ofJPME by using Joint
AQDs to identify officers who have completed JPME (Kovach, 1996, Bowman, 1996).
These AQDs include JS1, JS7, and JS8. A brief description of these AQDs is provided in
Appendix E. For a more detailed description, this author refers the reader to (Perspective,
January 1996) and (DON, 1992).
Reiterating a point made earlier, not all officers completing JPME are designated
JSOs. Additionally, not all officers completing JPME obtain a Joint AQD. Furthermore,
CJCS mandated removal of all JS7 AQDs from officers who completed JPME Phase I
prior to 1989, but did not subsequently complete JPME Phase II prior to January 1, 1994
(CJCS, 1996). Although these same officers still maintained their JPME SSCs, the exact
number of officers this policy change affected is not known. 84 Suffice it to say, some
number of officers who have completed JPME are not accounted for by a Joint AQD in
these data sets.
84 Telephone conversation with LT Mike Velasquez, PERS-455C, January, 27
1997
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At this point in the analysis, the question is: By not accounting for all officers
completing JPME, did this significantly impact the results of previous analyses?
(Kovach, 1996, Bowman, 1996) One cannot be certain it did not. Although, one thing is
certain, an analysis of the effects ofJPME on URL officers should include all URL
officers who have completed JPME ~ not just those identified with Joint AQDs. For this
reason alone, this analysis does not rely solely on the Joint AQDs.
For purposes of this analysis, the different Service School Codes (SSC) assigned
to an officer in accordance with (DON, 1992) provide the basis for determining JPME
completion: level, phase and source. There are specific SSCs assigned that make
distinctions for whether an officer completed Intermediate or Senior, resident or
nonresident, Federal Executive Fellowship or Foreign Service College, Phase II or Phase
I/II (combined) JPME. These distinctions are shown in Appendices F through M. For a
more detailed description of these SSCs, this author refers the reader to (DON, 1992).
C. DATA FILES
The aggregated files for the 0-4, 0-5 and 0-6 Promotion Board Files provide the
basis for comparing effects of JPME across URL communities at different points in a
career. Using the SSCs it was possible to determine the total number of officers
completing JPME by any means from the three data sets. Results show a very small
number of officers completing JPME prior to the 0-4 Promotion Board. There were 65
officers in this category, which account for only 4 percent of all the officers completing
JPME from the three data sets. Consequently, it wasn't necessary to construct a
promotion model for this data set. Although, since some officers were able to complete
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JPME this soon in their careers, it provided the additional opportunities to measure the
effects ofJPME on some officers.
The primary files used for this analysis consist of the 0-5 and 0-6 Promotion
Board Files. The majority of the officers from these three data sets completing JPME did
so prior to the 0-5 Promotion Board. There were 91 1 officers in this category, which
accounted for almost 56 percent of all the officers completing JPME. The second greatest
percentage of officers from these three data sets completing JPME did so after the 0-5
and before the 0-6 Promotion Board. There were 655 officers in this category, which
accounted for 40 percent of all officers completing JPME.
Table 4.1 shows the greatest proportion of officers completing JPME between all
three data sets occurred between the 0-4 and 0-5 promotion board, the second greatest
between the 0-5 and 0-6 boards, and the smallest prior to 0-4. Additionally, this type of
proportional relationship can be extended to show a cumulative relationship. Here, only
four percent of all officers complete JPME prior to 0-4, 60 percent prior to 0-5, and 100
percent prior to 0-6.
Table 4. 1 . Proportion of Officers Completing JPME as a Function of Completion Time
COMPLETED TOTAL # PERCENT CUMULATIVE
<0-4 65 4% 4%
>0-4 <0-5 911 56% 60%
>0-5 <0-6 655 40% 100%
COMPLETED 1631 100% —
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The previous proportional relationships don't necessarily hold true for all JPME
completion, because some officers don't complete it until after the 0-6 and prior to the O-
7 Promotion Boards. Unfortunately, that data set was not available for this analysis.
Additionally, a proportional analysis of this nature doesn't take into account the relative
decrease in number of officers between ranks of 0-4, 0-5 and 0-6. None-the-less, it
provides some basis for comparison. The next section focuses on each of the data sets.
D. DATA SETS
The 0-4, 0-5, and 0-6 data sets are used to determine the effects ofJPME on all
URL officers throughout their careers. As mentioned earlier, to effectively compare the
differences ofJPME on URL officers, it is necessary to compare the same URL officers
at the same time. The 0-4, 0-5 and 0-6 Promotion Boards provide the most suitable
points in time for measuring these effects. Since it is necessary to measure the effects of
JPME on all officers at the respective promotion boards, this analysis is concerned only
with those officers actually staying to those promotion boards. The following paragraphs
provide some general statistics by URL community.
1. 0-4 Promotion Board File
There were a total of 9686 URL officers in the 0-4 Promotion Board File. Of
these officers, 65 had completed JPME. Noteworthy, is all officers completing JPME
prior to the 0-4 Promotion Board stayed to this Board. This amounts to a 100 percent
retention rate of all officers completing JPME prior to the 0-4 Promotion Board.
Table 4.2 shows the number ofURL officers completing JPME appearing before the
FY86-95 0-4 Promotion Boards by designator and level, phase, and source of JPME.
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Table 4.2. Number of Officers Completing JPME Appearing Before the FY86-95
Promotion Boards (0-4), By Designator and Level, Phase, and Source of JPME.
DESIGNATORS
JPME







NONRESIDENT 22 9 10 22 63
EQUIVALENT 1 1
PHASE II
PHASE I/II 1 1
NO JPME 3105 1480 2866 2170 9621
TOTAL 3127 1489 2876 2194 9686
% WITH JPME 0.7% 0.6% 0.3% 1.1% 0.7%
Of course, not all 65 officers with JPME who stayed to the 0-4 Promotion Board
were successful in promoting. Of those 65 officers, only 44 successfully promoted,
which amounts to a 68 percent promotion rate. The promotion rates for the individual
types, sources and levels ofJPME include: nonresident JPME 67 percent, equivalent and
Phase I/II 100 percent. Table 4.3 shows the number ofURL officers completing JPME
promoting during FY86-95 0-4 Promotion Boards by designator and level, phase, and
source of JPME.
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Table 4.3. Number ofURL Officers Completing JPME Promoting During the FY86-95
Promotion Boards (0-4), By Designator and Level, Phase, and Source of JPME.
DESIGNATORS
JPME







NONRESIDENT 14 9 6 13 42
EQUIVALENT 1 1
PHASE II
PHASE I/II 1 1
NO JPME 2287 1196 2163 1543 7189
TOTAL 2301 1205 2169 1558 7233
% WITH JPME 0.6% 0.7% 0.3% 1.0% 0.6%
2. 0-5 Promotion Board File
There were a total of 6529 URL officers in the 0-5 Promotion Board File. Of
these officers, 955 had previously completed JPME. This figure includes the same 44
officers from above. Noteworthy, is all officers completing JPME prior to the 0-5
Promotion Board stayed to this Board as well. This amounts to a 100 percent retention
rate of all officers completing JPME prior to the 0-5 Promotion Board. Table 4.4 shows
the number ofURL officers completing JPME appearing before the FY86-95 0-5
Promotion Boards by designator and level, phase, and source of JPME.
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Table 4.4. Number ofURL Officers Completing JPME Appearing Before the FY86-95
Promotion Boards (0-5), By Designator and Level, Phase, and Source of JPME.
DESIGNATORS
JPME






RESIDENT 167 12 189 174 542






RESIDENT 2 1 3
PHASE I/II





NONRESIDENT 13 7 14 22 56
EQUIVALENT 11 2 11 24
PHASE II 35 4 16 22 77
NO JPME 1753 837 1715 1269 5574
TOTAL 2069 874 2015 1571 6529
% WITH JPME 15% 4% 15% 19% 15%
Of course, not all 955 officers with JPME who stayed to the 0-5 Promotion Board
were successful in promoting. Of those 955, only 663 successfully promoted, which
amounts to a 69 percent promotion rate. The promotion rates for the individual types,
sources, and levels ofJPME included: intermediate Phase I resident 72 percent, senior
Phase I resident 67 percent, intermediate Phase I/II 60 percent, nonresident Phase 161
percent, equivalent 71 percent, and Phase II 69 percent. Table 4.5 shows the number of
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URL officers completing JPME promoting during the FY86-95 0-5 Promotion Boards by
designator and level, phase, and source of JPME.
Table 4.5. Number of Officers Completing JPME Promoting During the FY86-95
Promotion Boards (0-5), By Designator and Level, Phase, and Source of JPME.
DESIGNATORS
JPME






RESIDENT 118 7 149 114 388






RESIDENT 1 1 2
PHASE I / II





NONRESIDENT 11 6 9 8 34
EQUIVALENT 8 2 7 17
PHASE II 26 3 12 12 53
NO JPME 1121 638 1207 720 3686
TOTAL 1355 665 1433 896 4349
% WITH JPME 17% 4% 16% 20% 15%
3. 0-6 Promotion Board File
There were a total of 3950 URL officers in the 0-6 Promotion Board File. Of
these officers, 1318 had previously completed JPME. This figure includes the same
officers from above. A total of 33 officers did not stay to the Promotion Board leaving
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only 1285 officers with JPME. This accounts for 97 percent retention rate of all officers
completing JPME prior to the 0-5 Promotion Board. Table 4.6 shows the number of
URL officers completing JPME appearing before the FY86-95 0-6 Promotion Boards by
designator and level, phase, and source ofJPME.
Table 4.6. Number of Officers Completing JPME Appearing Before the FY86-95
Promotion Boards (0-6), By Designator and Level, Phase, and Source of JPME.
DESIGNATORS
JPME






RESIDENT 136 209 81 426






RESIDENT 77 10 225 74 386
PHASE I / II 71 2 40 17 130





NONRESIDENT 8 9 10 2 29
EQUIVALENT 27 1 10 12 50
PHASE II 8 1 12 4 25
NO JPME 814 430 957 459 2660
TOTAL 1224 461 1579 686 3950
% WITH JPME 33% 7% 39% 33% 33%
Of course, not all 1285 officers with JPME who stayed to the 0-6 Promotion
Board were successful in promoting. Of those 1285, only 770 successfully promoted,
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which amounts to a 60 percent promotion rate. The promotion rates for individual types,
sources, and levels ofJPME included: intermediate Phase I resident 57 percent,
intermediate Phase I/II 5 1 percent, senior Phase I resident 65 percent, senior Phase I/II 66
percent, nonresident Phase I 52 percent, equivalent 60 percent, and Phase II 80 percent.
Table 4.7 shows the number ofURL officers completing JPME promoting during FY86-
95 0-6 Promotion Boards by designator and level, phase, and source of JPME.
Table 4.7. Number of Officers Completing JPME Promoting During the FY86-95
Promotion Boards (0-6), By Designator and Level, Phase, and Source of JPME.
DESIGNATORS
JPME






RESIDENT 73 128 42 243






RESIDENT 47 6 153 45 251
PHASE I / II 47 1 32 6 86





NONRESIDENT 5 5 5 15
EQUIVALENT 18 1 7 4 30
PHASE II 6 1 10 i 20
NO JPME 409 276 439 137 1261
TOTAL 652 296 832 251 2031
% WITH JPME 37% 7% 47% 45% 38%
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One final observation about each of these files concerns the proportion of officers
completing JPME from each of the communities. For the most part, the SWO, Pilot, and
NFO communities maintain approximately the same proportion of officers with JPME,
whereas the NUC community has a very small proportion of its officers with JPME as
compared to the other three communities. This may occur for two possible reasons.
First, the NUC community does not have as large a share of the JDAL as do the other
communities. Second, the NUC community has in the past been denoted as having a
severe shortage of officers. 85 Even though, the NUC community probably would like to
have more officers with JPME, it may not have been able to send as many, due to the
operational constraints imposed on the community. Combine this with the already
constrained NUC career path and the consequences become apparent.
The following chapter (Chapter V) uses statistical analysis techniques to analyze
the data sets in answering the question: How has JPME affected the URL Naval officer
career. However, before turning to statistical techniques, the following section describes
the methodology which was used to conduct the analysis.
E. METHODOLOGY
This Thesis analyzes the effect ofJPME on an officer's likelihood of promotion.
As a result ofGNA, joint promotion objectives now appear more important than ever.
Consequently, JPME is also more important to obtain. It would seem logical then, since
JPME poses such a significant investment in a URL career, that the URL communities
85 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, GPO, Washington, DC,
January 1990.
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would only want to send their very best officers to these assignments ~ those that are
deemed to be the most promotable.
A number of studies have examined the best method of measuring quality of
officers, and promotion continues to provide the best overall objective measure of
quality. LOGIT models are designed for analyzing determinants of a categorical variable,
and by its nature, promotion is a binary categorical variable. Therefore, promotion
conveniently provides for use ofmaximum likelihood LOGIT models to estimate the
probability of being promoted to the rank of 0-5 or 0-6.
A binomial LOGIT is an estimation technique for equations that involve dummy
(0, 1) dependent variables. LOGIT models provide parameter estimates that prove
difficult to interpret directly, since they represent the log of the odds ratio of being
promoted per unit increase in the explanatory variable in question holding the other
explanatory variables constant. 86 Odds refers to the ratio of the probability a choice will
be made (P) divided by the probability it will not (1 - P). For a more in-depth discussion
ofLOGIT technique and theory, this author recommends (Studenmund, 1992).
Once the LOGIT regression coefficients have been estimated and interpreted,
hypothesis testing and econometric analysis is undertaken in much the same way as for




by using formula 4.1 on the following page:





= B, x P ( i _ P ) (4 1}
In this equation, (B) represents the LOGIT parameter estimate for a given explanatory
variable, (P) represents the predicted probability of the event estimated from the sample
data, and (Pj) represents the marginal probability.
In this analysis, both linear regression and non-linear LOGIT models have been
estimated for final comparison between results. Several non-linear LOGIT models are
specified and estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. Models were constructed
for the entire population for both the Commander and Captain Promotion Boards. For
these models, promotion is assumed to be a function of a number of independent
variables. Specific variables in each model are introduced to control for different types of
GRAD ED and JPME, the URL communities (SWO, NUC, PIL, NFO) as well as fiscal
years during the period. 87 In particular, models in this analysis specify promotion as a




2. Pre-service academic performance
3. Age at officer commissioning.
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Initially, the promotion models were run using fiscal year dummy variables with
FY90 as the base year. This technique was intended to show whether there were any
significant differences in promotion between fiscal years. For the 0-5 data set four years,
FY86, FY87, FY88 and FY93 proved to be significantly different from FY90. For the
0-6 data set, only one year, FY91 and FY92 proved to be significantly different from
FY90. These fiscal year variables were then removed, and final models run without
them. The results of these final models are shown in Chapter V.
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4. Military service performance.
5. GRAD ED source.
6. GRAD ED utilization.
8. Joint duty assignment (JDA).
9. JPME (level, type, and source).
10. URL community
One final approach in analyzing the effect ofJPME on promotion is to determine
the marginal (i.e., added) effect ofJPME on the probability of promotion. To analyze the
marginal effects, a "notional person" technique is employed. Recalling a discussion of
this technique in Chapter I, it was described as a way to derive an overall probability of a
promotion for an average person from the population (i.e., "notional person"). Once
established, this probability provides a baseline with which to determine the marginal
effects (i.e., marginal probabilities) on promotion as a result of changing a single variable
while keeping all other variables constant ~ ceteris parabis. In this case, the variables of
interest are those related to JPME. For this analysis, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was
used to estimate the marginal probabilities for each of the four URL communities. 88
F. VARIABLE DEFINITION
This model uses promotion as its dependent variable, since it has been determined
to be the most suitable "proxy" for measuring the effects ofJPME on the performance of
officers. With a properly specified model, one seeks to determine a cause and effect
88 The particular spreadsheet technique used to estimate the marginal probabilities
was developed by Dr. William Bowman of the U.S. Naval Academy.
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relationship between independent variables and promotion. As such, independent
variables have been chosen because they were determined to best hypothesize this cause
and effect relationship. This determination was based upon the author's personal
expectations as well as their use in previous studies (Bowman, 1996; Bowman-Mehay,
1995; Kovach, 1996). The following section contains a description of the variables used
in the promotion models.
For the promotion models the dependent variable is a binary variable
(PROMOTE), which takes a value of one (1) if an officer is selected for promotion to
Commander (0-5) or Captain (0-6), and a value of zero (0) if an officer is not selected.
The first two independent or explanatory variables describe demographic
information of the officer. The first demographic variable (MARRIED) is a binary
variable which takes the value one (1) if an officer is married and a value of zero (0) if
that officer is not married. The second variable (AGEOl) is a continuous variable which
denotes an officer's age at time of commissioning.
The next four variables describe an officer's prior undergraduate academic
performance. The first variable is (UGRDTECH) is a categorical variable, which takes
on a value of one (1) if an officer completed a technical undergraduate degree, and zero
(0) if an officer did not. The first of three APC variables, (APC1) is a categorical variable,
which takes on a value of zero (0) through five (5), and reflects an officer's cumulative
undergraduate grade-point average. The second APC variable, (APC2) is a categorical
variable, which takes on a value of zero (0) through six (6), and reflects an officer's
academic performance in calculus-related mathematics courses. The third APC variable,
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(APC3) is a categorical variable, which takes on a value of zero (0) through five (5), and
reflects an officer's academic performance in physics-related courses. In the case of these
three APC variables, the coding is reversed — the lower the APC variables, the higher an
officer's performance in each of the respective areas.
The next three variables describe an officer's military performance. The first two
variables are derived from an officer's performance evaluation, or fitness report (FITREP)
data. The first variable (RAPPED 12) is a categorical variable, which takes on a value of
one (1) if an officer received a "recommendation for accelerated promotion" on any of
his/her FITREPS during the rank of Ensign or LTJG, and zero (0) if that officer did not.
The second variable (RAPPED3) is a categorical variable, which takes on a value of (1) if
an officer received a "recommendation for accelerated promotion" on any of his/her
FITREPS during the rank of Lieutenant (LT), and zero (0) if that officer did not. The
third variable (TIME04) is a continuous variable, which indicates the how long an officer
spent at the rank of 0-4.
The next seven variables describe various aspects of an officer's source of
graduate education attainment and subsequent utilization. The first variable
(ANYGRAD) is a binary variable which takes on the value one (1) if an officer
completed any type of graduate school degree, and zero (0) if that officer did not. The
second variable (NITESCHL) is a binary variable which takes on the value one (1) if an
officer completed a graduate degree on his/her own time and zero (0) if that officer did
not. The third variable (SALVEREG) is a binary variable which takes on the value of
one (1) if an officer completed a graduate degree from Salve Regina, College in Newport,
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Rhode Island, and zero (0) if that officer did not. The fourth variable (NWCDEGR) is a
binary variable which takes on the value of (1) if an officer received a graduate degree for
completing the Naval War College, and zero (0) if that officer did not. The fifth variable
(FFUNDNPS) is a binary variable which takes on the value of (1) if an officer completed
a graduate degree from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and zero (0) if that officer
did not. The sixth variable (FFUNDCIV) is a binary variable which takes on the value of
(1) if an officer completed a graduate degree under the Navy's Fully Funded Civilian
Institutions Program, and zero (0) if that officer did not. The seventh variable (UTILIZE)
is a binary variable which takes on the value of (1) if an officer has received credit for
utilizing his/her graduate subspecialty and zero (0) if that officer did not.
The next nine variables describe an officer's JPME completion level, type, and
source as well as his/her JDA assignment history. The first variable (ANYJPME) is a
binary variable which takes on a value of one (1) if an officer has completed any JPME,
and zero (0) if that officer has not. The second variable (INTRES) is a binary variable
which takes on the value of one (1) if an officer has completed Intermediate Resident
Phase I JPME, and zero (0) if that officer has not. The third variable (SRRES) is a binary
variable which takes on the value of one (1) if an officer has completed Senior Resident
Phase I JPME, and zero (0) if that officer has not. The fourth variable (NONRES) is a
binary variable which takes on the value of one (1) if an officer has completed
Nonresident Phase I JPME, and zero (0) if that officer has not. The fifth variable
(PHIIONLY) is a binary variable which takes on the value of one (1) if an officer has
completed Phase II JPME at AFSC after June 1990, and zero (0) if that officer has not.
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The sixth variable (BOTHJR) is a binary variable which takes on the value of one (1) if
an officer has completed Phase I/II JPME at AFSC before June 1990, and zero (0) if that
officer has not. The seventh variable (BOTHSR) is a binary variable which takes on the
value of one (1) if an officer has completed Phase I/II JPME at National War College or
the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and zero (0) if that officer has not. The
eighth variable (EQUIV) is a binary variable which takes on the value of one (1) if an
officer has been granted Phase I credit for completion of one of the CJCS approved JPME
Equivalents (FEF and Foreign Service Colleges), and zero (0) if that officer has not. The
final variable (JDA) is a binary variable which takes on the value of one (1) if an officer
has completed an assignment on the JDAL, and zero (0) if that officer has not.
The last four variables describe an officer's warfare designation. The first variable
(SWO) is a binary variable which takes on the value of one (1) if an officer is designated
a Surface Warfare Officer, and zero (0) if that officer is not. The second variable (NUC)
is a binary variable which takes on the value of one (1) if an officer is designated a
Nuclear Submarine Warfare Officer, and zero (0) if that officer is not. The third variable
(PIL) is a binary variable which takes on the value of one (1) if an officer is designated a
Pilot, and zero (0) if that officer is not. The fourth and final variable (NFO) is a binary
variable which takes on the value of one (1) if an officer is a designated a Naval Flight
Officer, and zero (0) if that officer is not.
Not all variables described above are used in each promotion models. Appendix
N and O provide a listing of all variable names and definitions used in each of the 0-5




The primary goal of this Thesis is to examine the effects of completing JPME on
the probability of promotion of the URL Naval officer to 0-5 and 0-6. This chapter uses
a three-step approach to achieve this goal. The first step consists of comparing variable
means between designators from the 0-5 and 0-6 data sets. The second step is devoted
to LOGIT and linear regression results from the respective Commander and Captain data
sets. The third and final step is devoted to estimating marginal probabilities of promotion
across all four URL communities.
B. COMPARISON OF VARIABLE MEANS
As mentioned in an earlier section of this thesis, a number of differences can
result when comparing the effects of different independent variables across communities.
One possible way to see a difference in the effects is by examining the means of the
common explanatory variables across URL communities and between data sets. For the
explanatory variables defined in the previous chapter, this is done for the 0-5 and 0-6
Promotion Board data sets, and the results are shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1. Variable Means by Designator and Community for 0-5 and 0-6 Boards.
URL COMMUNITIES
SWO(lllO) NUC (1120) PILOT (1310) NFO (1320)
VARIABLES 0-5 0-6 0-5 0-6 0-5 0-6 0-5 0-6
MARRIED 0.86 0.93 0.9 0.96 0.9 0.94 0.88 0.95
AGEOl 22.9 22.3 22.6 22.3 22.5 22.4 23.5 22.8
UGRDTECH 0.48 0.29 0.89 0.64 0.52 0.32 0.47 0.36
APC1 2.48 3.78 1.59 2.49 2.51 3.68 2.51 3.19
APC2 2.98 3.12 1.49 1.49 2.97 3.36 3.12 3.49
APC3 3.55 3.54 1.4 1.45 3.43 3.71 3.69 3.9
RAPPED12 0.49 0.15 0.48 0.18 0.34 0.11 0.34 0.15
RAPPED3 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.32 0.21 0.31 0.23 0.37
ANYGRAD 0.42 0.6 0.28 0.34 0.33 0.46 0.43 0.52
UTILIZE 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.13
ANYJPME 0.14 0.31 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.37 0.14 0.3
JDA 0.1 0.24 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.26
N 2069 1224 874 461 2015 1579 1571 686
A number of differences in the variable means are apparent in Table 5.1 . For
example, on average NUC officers tend to complete JPME less often than other
communities. Also, on average NUC officers tend to complete fewer JDAs than other
communities. One explanation for why NUC's tend to complete less JPME and JDAs,
because the NUC community's share of the JDAL is much smaller than that of the other
communities. Even though, on the surface there may seem to be differences in means of
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the variables, this doesn't necessarily suggest there will be significant differences in the
effects ofJPME on promotion across communities.
To actually determine the effects ofJPME on promotion, there are two potential
techniques. The first method is to specify and run a single model, including community
specific variables in the model. This method allows determination of whether differences
in promotion are significant across communities relative to a base case. In this analysis,
the base case is the SWO community. The second technique is to run four separate
models ~ one for each of the URL communities. This author has chosen to employ the
former technique, the results of which are shown in the following section.
C. LOGIT AND LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS
Two basic LOGIT and linear regression models are specified and estimated: one
for officers appearing before the 0-5 Promotion Board and one for officers appearing
before the 0-6 Promotion Board. The results are presented in the following sections.
1. Commander Data Set
A LOGIT model, using the variables defined in the previous chapter, was
specified for the 0-5 Promotion Board. A linear regression model was also specified
using the same variables to compare with the LOGIT results. In each of these models, the
SWO community is the reference case. Table 5.2 shows results from both the LOGIT and
linear regression models used to analyze the effects ofJPME on promotion to 0-5 for
URL Naval officers.
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Table 5.2. Estimated Effects on URL Officer Promotion to 0-5.
LINEAR LOGIT
VARIABLES PARAMETER T-STAT PARAMETER T-STAT
INTERCEPT* 1.2122 17.445 3.5519 9.95
MARRIED 0.0916 5.404 0.4597 5.29
AGEOl -0.0347 -12.357 -0.1719 -11.87
UGRDTECH -0.0451 -3.174 -0.2447 -3.23
APC1 -0.0245 -3.791 -0.1319 -3.84
APC2 -0.005 -0.994 -0.9279 -1.05
APC3 -0.0089 -1.735 -0.0504 -1.82
RAPPED12 0.1979 17.508 1.0655 16.83
RAPPED3 0.2108 15.554 0.9927 14.48
NITESCHL 0.0399 1.826 0.2144 2.29
SALVEREG 0.1194 2.918 0.6667 2.84
NWCDEGR 0.0871 1.826 0.4734 1.17
FFUNDNPS 0.0865 5.292 0.479 5.26
FFUNDCIV 0.0803 2.01 0.4798 2
UTILIZE -0.1072 -4.544 -0.5942 -4.74
ANYJPME 0.0155 0.866 0.082 0.86
JDA -0.054 -2.716 -0.2859 -2.79
NUC 0.0707 3.507 0.4194 3.75
PIL 0.0828 5.886 0.4323 5.75
NFO 0.0245 -1.646 -0.1044 -1.37
SAMPLE SIZE 6465 6465
R Concordance 0.1532 73.4
* Dependent Variable: Promotion to 0-5 (Commander)
Note: Asymptotic Wald chi-square ("T2 ") statistics reported for LOGIT.
Coefficients significant at the 10% level are bolded.
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Columns 2 and 3 indicate the estimated coefficients for the linear and LOGIT
regression models, respectively. All independent variables in the model are significant
with the exception of three ~ APC2, ANYJPME, and NFO. Importantly, this shows that
JPME does not have a significant effect on promotion to 0-5 for URL Naval officers ~
regardless of the level, phase, or source of JPME. This could result for two possible
reasons. One, there may not have been enough officers with JPME at the 0-5 Board to
provide enough variation to ascertain whether JPME has a significant effect on
promotion. One can see from Table 5.1, for example, that only four percent of the
nuclear officers had any JPME at the of the 0-5 Promotion Board. In addition, less than
fifteen percent of the other three groups have any JPME at that time also. Two, the
criteria for the 0-5 Promotion Board may not consider JPME as a significant factor for
promotion. This stands to reason, because at the 0-5 level, the most important milestone
of any URL officer is screening for "command at sea." Consequently, JPME would not
necessarily be considered a key criteria at this point.
In contrast, based on the data, it seems the positive impact of a graduate degree
continues through the 0-5 promotion board — regardless of the type of degree. The 1974
DON Officer Professional Development Study (DON, 1974) suggested "a graduate
degree is intended to take an officer through the first half of his/her career." It would
seem, then, that promotion to 0-5 might mark the half-way point in a URL Naval officer
career. Even though, 0-5 might seem rather late in a career to be considered half-way.
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2. Captain Data Set
A LOGIT model, using the variables shown in the previous chapter, was specified
for the 0-6 Promotion Board. A linear regression model was also specified using the
same variables to compare with the LOGIT results. In each of these models, with the
exception of the SWO community, variables were included for each of the URL
communities. Table 5.3 shows results of both the LOGIT and linear regression models
used to analyze the effects ofJPME on promotion to Captain for URL Naval officers.
Columns 2 and 3 indicate the estimated coefficients for the linear and LOGIT
regression models, respectively. All independent variables in the model are significant
with the exception of six - UGRDTECH, APC3, ANYGRAD, NONRES, BOTHINT,
EQUIV and PIL. Importantly, GRAD ED does not seem to have a significant effect on
promotion to 0-6 for URL Naval officers ~ regardless of the type of degree. Perhaps,
one possible reason is that GRAD ED is no longer a discriminating criteria for the 0-6
Promotion Board ~ at this point in a URL Naval officer career the discriminating criteria
may shift to JPME.
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Table 5.3. Estimated Effects ofJPME on URL Officer Promotion to 0-6.
LINEAR LOGIT
VARIABLES PARAMETER T-STAT PARAMETER T-STAT
INTERCEPT* 1.7617 9.49 5.971 6.83
MARRIED 0.1409 4.05 0.631 3.97
AGEOl -0.018 -3.05 -0.084 -3.13
UGRDTECH -0.0215 -1.09 -0.09 -1.08
APC1 -0.0273 -2.72 -0.127 -2.79
APC2 -0.0146 -1.88 -0.065 -1.95
APC3 0.0067 0.78 0.032 0.84
RAPPED12 0.1146 4.75 0.541 4.85
RAPPED3 0.113 6.55 0.508 6.59
TIME04 -0.1589 -7.03 -0.752 -6.99
ANYGRAD 0.0191 1.04 0.084 1.01
UTILIZE -0.0545 2 -0.244 -1.99
INTRES 0.0854 3.1 0.375 3.02
SRRES 0.1716 5.97 0.783 5.86
NONRES -0.114 -1.21 -0.512 -1.17
PHIIONLY 0.1756 1.79 1.021 1.88
BOTHJR -0.0004 -0.01 -0.002 -0.01
BOTHSR 0.1922 4.24 0.892 4.15
EQUIV 0.083 1.13 0.392 1.15
JDA -0.1594 -7.86 -0.724 -7.82
NUC 0.1095 3.35 0.491 3.31
PIL -0.0008 -0.04 0.001 0.01
NFO -0.1509 -6.09 -0.687 -6.05
SAMPLE SIZE 3337 3337 ^"
R Concordance 0.1129 69.1
* Dependent Variable: Promotion to 0-6 (Captain)
Note: Asymptotic Wald chi-square ("T2")statistics reported for LOGIT.
Coefficients significant at the 10% level are bolded.
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JPME completed in some form, has a significant effect on promotion to 0-6. This
is particularly true when an officer completes either intermediate resident Phase I
(INTRES), senior resident Phase I (SRRES), Phase II (PHIIONLY), or senior Phase I/II
(BOTHSR). According to the results of this study, however, there are three forms of
JPME that have no significant impact on promotion to 0-6. These are nonresident Phase
I, equivalents (FEF and foreign Service colleges), and intermediate Phase I/II (combined).
As far as nonresident and the equivalents are concerned, their insignificance
possibly results from the fact that very few officers are able to complete either of these
forms of JPME. However, the insignificance of these results does not necessarily imply
that by completing any of these forms they do not in some way contribute to a URL Naval
officer career. On the contrary, they actually fulfill one of two prerequisites for
assignment to a JDA — JPME Phase I being one of those prerequisites. Therefore,
nonresident Phase I JPME and the equivalents actually provide an important alternative to
completing Phase I JPME, regardless, of their insignificance with respect to promotion.
As far as intermediate Phase I/II is concerned, its insignificance possibly results
from an noticeable difference in the quality of officers assigned to JPME and JDAs
before 1989 and after 1989. As mentioned in (Harrell, 1996 and Kovach, 1996), prior to
1989 the quality of officers assigned to JPME and JDAs apparently was not of the same
quality assigned after 1989.
Overall, these results suggest the existence of a "critical point" point in the URL
Naval officer career where JPME and graduate education can actually be considered
substitutes for one another. This "critical point" seems to originate following the 0-5
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Promotion Board. At this "critical point," a trade-off occurs between the effects ofJPME
and GRAD ED on promotion ofURL Naval officers.
Interestingly enough, the trade-off between JPME and GRAD ED occurs at a
stage in the URL Naval officer career when the primary focus shifts from one of
"community-specific" training, to as (Builder, 1989) refers, a blending of a wide range of
skills in the officer corps. It is at this same change-over point that the concept of
"jointness" finally emerges as a priority in the URL Naval officer career. Although, in
some ways the Navy's approach to JPME may be construed by some as not in keeping
with the overall intent of the continuum ofJPME provided for in the OPMEP, it would
seem the Navy's overall approach is in keeping with its own organizational objectives.
Although, well beyond the scope of this thesis, a related question that emerges is: How,
then, can the Navy incorporate the joint educational continuum policies of the OPMEP
into the URL Naval officer career, and still maintain career efficiency and effectiveness?
D. MARGINAL EFFECTS OF JPME ON PROMOTION
Although, the linear regression coefficients can be interpreted directly as estimates
of marginal probabilities, they do not provide the most accurate estimates. The LOGIT
coefficients can be transformed into marginal probabilities which have superior
descriptive capabilities. The procedure for transforming the coefficients into marginal
probabilities was briefly described in a previous chapter. This section provides a more
detailed summary of the transformation process. There are a number of techniques to
transform LOGIT coefficients into marginal probabilities. As indicated above, this
analysis uses an Excel spreadsheet to compute this transformation. A copy of the Excel
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spreadsheet layout used to determine the marginal probabilities for both the 0-5 and 0-6
Promotion Boards can be found in Appendix P and Q.
The procedure for transforming the independent variable LOGIT coefficients into
marginal probabilities is performed in the following manner. First, the explanatory
dummy variables (0,1) are all set to zero, and the continuous variables are set to the mean
for the population being considered. This process establishes a baseline probability of
promotion for a "notional person" from the population in question. In the case of this
analysis, the population just so happens to be the SWO community. Figure 5.1 shows the
"notional SWO" as: single, age 23 at commissioning, has average APCs and a
nontechnical undergraduate degree, has not completed a graduate degree, JPME of any
kind, a JDA, nor a subspecialty utilization tour.
In the next step each explanatory variable is changed while holding the other
variables constant. In the case of the dummy variables, they are changed from zero to one
and the continuous variables are given a unit increase in value. The probability of
promotion is noted both before and after the variable is changed. The difference in these
probabilities provides the resulting marginal probability (marginal effect) for that
particular variable. The variable is then set back to its original value, and the same
process of changing variables continues in succession for the rest of the variables. In this
manner, the baseline probability of promotion for a "notional person" acts as a reference
probability from which all marginal probabilities are calculated.
This method of estimation was used to calculate the marginal probabilities for the
four URL communities for the 0-5 and 0-6 Promotion Boards shown in Tables 5.4 and
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5.5. For example, column 2 shows for a "notional SWO" appearing before the FY1985-
1994 0-5 Promotion Boards, the average probability of promotion is 65 percent. A SWO
with the same characteristics, and completing a graduate degree from Salve Regina
College (SALVEREG) while attending the Naval War College, has a 1 5 percent higher
probability of promotion to 0-5 (i.e., 75 percent). For that same "notional SWO"
appearing before the FY1 985-1 994 0-6 Promotion Boards, the average probability of
promotion is 53 percent. A SWO with the same characteristics, but completing
intermediate Phase I resident (INTRES) JPME, has an 8 percent higher probability of
promotion to 0-6 (i.e., 61 percent). In each of these examples, the SWO is able to
maximize his/her probability of promotion to 0-5 and 0-6 through the simultaneous
combination of these two forms of human capital investment.
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Table 5.4. Marginal Effects of Promotion to 0-5 by Community.




65% 76% 71% 57%
MARRIED 10% 11% 11% 9%
AGEOl -3% -4% -4% -3%
UGRDTECH -5% -6% -6% -4%
APC1 -3% -3% -3% -2%
APC2 -1% -1% -1% -1%
APC3 -1% -1% -1% -1%
RAPPED12 25% 25% 26% 24%
RAPPED3 23% 24% 24% 22%
NITESCHL 4% 5% 5% 4%
SALVEREG 15% 16% 16% 14%
NWCDEGR 10% 12% 12% 9%
FFUNDNPS 10% 12%> 12% 10%
FFUNDCIV 10% 12% 12% 10%
UTILIZE -10% -14% -13% -9%
ANYJPME 2% 2% 2% 1%
JDA -5% -7% -7% -5%
N 2069 874 2015 1571
Note: Overall promotion rates were calculated from 0-5 data set for period 1986 to 1994.
Marginal probabilities shown as increases (+) or decreases (-) in percentage points.
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The results in Table 5.4 show that by completing any type of advanced degree a
URL officer is able to maximize his/her the probability of promotion to 0-5. Once again,
the highest marginal probability amongst the advanced degrees is achieved by those
officers completing a graduate degree at Salve Regina College in Newport, RI, while a
graduate degree from the Naval War College provides a substantially smaller marginal
probability of promotion. 89 The apparent difference in marginal probabilities between an
advanced degree from Salve Regina and one from the Naval War College may reflect a
potential impact of the Navy's decision to accredit the Naval War College in 1991.
However, one cannot be certain of this effect. On the other hand, by completing any
level, phase or source ofJPME a URL officer does not realize an appreciable impact on
his/her probability of promotion to 0-5.
89 The data does not reflect grandfathering of advanced degrees to NWC graduates
during the period of 1985 to 1991 . Also, the data does not show any officers as having
advanced degrees from both Salve Regina and NWC.
107
Table 5.5. Marginal Effects on Promotion to 0-6 by Community.




53% 64% 53% 37%
MARRIED 14% 16% 15% 11%
AGEOl -2% -2% -2% -1%
UGRDTECH -2% -2% -2% -1%
APC1 -3% -3% -3% -2%
APC2 -1% -2% -1% 1%
APC3 1% 1% 1% 0%
RAPPED12 12% 13% 12% 9%
RAPPED3 11% 13% 12% 8%
TIME04 -13% -17% -13% -8%
ANYGRAD 2% 2% 2% 1%
UTILIZE -5% -6% -5% -3%
INTRES 8% 9% 8% 6%
SRRES 18% 19% 18% 14%
NONRES -9% -12% -9% -6%
PHIIONLY 24% 24% 24% 19%
BOTHINT 0% 0% 0% 0%
BOTHSR 21% 22% 21% 16%
EQUIV 9% 10% 9% 6%
JDA -13% -17% -13% -8%
N 1224 461 1579 686
Note: Overall promotion rates were calculated from 0-6 data set for period 1986 to 1994.
Marginal probabilities shown as increases (+) or decreases (-) in percentage points.
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The results in Table 5.5 show that by completing any advanced degree a URL
officer does not realize an appreciable increase in his/her probability of promotion to 0-6.
On the other hand, by completing some forms ofJPME a URL officer is able to
maximize his/her probability of promotion to 0-6. However, there are two forms of
JPME which apparently have either a negative impact or no effect at all on promotion.
Particularly, by completing nonresident JPME a URL officer effectively decreases his/her
probability of promotion; whereas, completing intermediate Phase I/II has no apparent
impact on promotion to 0-6.
These results show one possible impact from combining JPME and GRAD ED is
to increase career efficiency and effectiveness. The previous example illustrates this
point by showing a "notional SWO" can effectively maximize his/her probability of
promotion to 0-5 and 0-6 by completing JPME and GRAD ED at the same time. A
question worth mentioning is: Are there any other forms ofJPME and GRAD ED that,
when combined, result in a similar impact on the URL Naval officer career? In light this
simple demonstration of the potential benefits from such an impact, this question merits
further analysis.
In light of these results the next, and final chapter (Chapter VI) concludes this
thesis by providing some summary remarks and recommendations for possible
improvement to the DON's current policies and practices concerning JPME.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The statistical and empirical results of this thesis show that JPME has four
primary impacts on the URL Naval officer career. The primary areas impacted include:
completion, retention, promotion, and interaction witrTother forms ofhuman capital
investment (i.e., graduate education). This chapter provides a summary of these impacts
drawing on the statistical and empirical analyses results presented in this thesis. The
chapter also provides some recommendations and possible areas for further research




Results from the data analysis in Chapter IV reveal there are various
windows of opportunity in a URL career for completing JPME. The first window of
opportunity typically occurs before the 0-4 promotion board. Interestingly enough, the
Navy is the only service that still allows its 0-3 s to complete JPME ~ the other services
require selection for 0-4 before undertaking JPME. Statistical results of this analysis
indicate the promotion rate of the 65 officers who completed JPME during this period
was 68 percent, which is slightly lower than the 75 percent promotion rate for all 0-4s in
the data set. This statistic may indicate the potential for interaction between JPME and
other forms of human capital investment at earlier stages in a URL Naval officer career.
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Possible investments include: graduate education and community-specific training. In
light of the career-long continuum of education outlined in the OPMEP (CJCS, 1996),
and the NPS successful initiative establishing itself as an institutional source of JPME,
further analysis of early completion ofJPME in the Navy is clearly warranted.
The second window of opportunity for completing JPME typically occurs between
the 10 and 15 year point in a career (i.e., between the 0-4 and 0-5 Promotion Boards).
This period is marked by the greatest overall percentage ofJPME completion from the
three data sets. Appendix B, C, and D show an explicit provision made for JPME during
this period in all URL officer career patterns. Historically, these completion results
reflect this period as optimal for completing JPME.
The third window of opportunity for completing JPME occurs between the 1 5 and
22 year point in a career (i.e., between the 0-5 and 0-6 Promotion Board). This period is
marked by the second greatest overall percentage ofJPME completion from the three data
sets. Again, Appendix B, C, and D show an explicit provision made for JPME during
this period in all URL officer career patterns. Historically, these completion results
reflect this period as the second most optimal period for completing JPME.
b. JPME Retention
Results from the data analysis in Chapter IV reveal those officers
completing JPME show an extremely high likelihood of retention in the Navy. During
the first and second windows of opportunity described above, all officers completing
JPME stayed in the Navy through subsequent promotion boards. Additionally, during the
last window of opportunity, only 3 percent of the officers completing JPME elected to
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leave the Navy prior to consideration for 0-7. This statistic is not surprising, since the O-
6 Promotion Board usually occurs after the 20 year mark in a career, which corresponds
with the retirement eligibility age for most officers. Reasonably, one may expect to
observe Naval officers leaving the Service at this point in their career. Unfortunately, due
to the nature of the data, it proved very difficult to determine when the officers leaving
during the final window actually completed JPME. However, one might be safe in
assuming the officers leaving during the last window did not complete JPME during the
same period.
2. Empirical Results
The results from the empirical analysis in Chapter V reveal the impacts ofJPME
on promotion vary depending upon promotion board level. The impact of completing any
form ofJPME has been insignificant for promotion to 0-5. However, the impact of
completing any form ofJPME has been significant for promotion to 0-6. Although, this
same impact has not necessarily applied to intermediate Phase I/II completion nor for
nonresident and equivalent forms of JPME.
Concerning past insignificance of intermediate Phase I/II completion, one possible
explanation may be found in the selection processes that existed prior to emphasis being
placed on them by GNA. This is highlighted by the comments from the RAND Study
found in Chapter II of this analysis as well as results from (Kovach, 1996). Both indicate
the quality of officers assigned to JPME and JDAs was suspect prior to 1989.
Concerning past insignificance of equivalent programs, one possible explanation may be
that very few officers are able to complete these forms of JPME. This is especially true
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of the FEF Programs, which traditionally have been highly selective and very
competitive. In the past, one benefit derived from these programs was Phase I JPME
credit. Now that these programs are scheduled to lose Phase I credit, a question that bears
mention is: Without the added benefit of Phase I JPME credit, how will the Navy
continue to attract high quality officers to the FEF Programs? This is another area that
warrants further study.
Concerning past insignificance of nonresident programs, one possible reason may
be officers perceive that nonresident programs do not provide sufficient benefit to
enhance performance during a career. As a result, very few officers may complete these
programs. This perception is highlighted in previous Air Force studies by (Burroughs,
1989 and Stevens, 1991). Another reason may be a selection bias on the part of the Navy.
The Navy may in fact be choosing the cream of the crop to complete resident JPME,
leaving the others to complete nonresident programs. This situation may be cause for an
overarching issue of equity — a situation where some officers are considered to be the
"haves" and others the "have nots." This concept of inequity is best described by Major
Paul L. Tomlinson.
Today's officer selection process — whether it be for promotion, command,
or school — is becoming a case of the "haves" and the "have nots." In
some cases, those without certain prerequisites already behind them will
most certainly fail the next selection opportunity.90
90 Tomlinson, Paul L., How Joint Office Management Legislation is Dividing Our
Officer Corps, Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, VA, October 1994.
114
In view of this quote, the question a relevant question is: Is there a perceived
inequity between those officers chosen to complete resident JPME and those not? If so,
what damage if any has been done to the morale and motivation of those officers not
chosen for resident JPME? This issue was explored by (Burroughs, 1989) in the context
of the Air Force, and would make for an equally interesting study in the Navy.
Even though, the nonresident and equivalents do not provide a significant increase
in the probability of promotion to 0-6, they are considered suitable substitutes to
obtaining resident Phase I JPME. Consequently, they present an officer with an
opportunity for assignment to Phase II JPME, which provides a significant increase in
probability of promotion. Therefore, the cumulative nature of Phase I and Phase II JPME
is an issue that warrants reinforcement at this point in the discussion.
The results also show another impact ofJPME is an interaction with GRAD ED.
Officers completing GRAD ED of any form prior to the 0-5 board have a significantly
greater probability of promotion to 0-5. In contrast, those officers completing GRAD ED
do not have a significantly greater probability of promoting to 0-6. This result highlights
the realization of a "critical point" in the URL Naval officer career, following the 0-5
Promotion Board, marked by the substitution ofGRAD ED with JPME. Prior to this
point in the URL Naval officer career, the higher probability investment consists of all
forms ofGRAD ED. After this point in the URL Naval officer career, the higher
probability investment shifts to some forms of JPME. This change-over point shows
evidence of a shift in focus of the URL officer career from technical competencies to the
more political-military, strategic and policy dimensions of operations.
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3. Marginal Probabilities
The results of the marginal probability calculations show the increased probability
of promotion from completing JPME measured across the different URL communities.
Overall, these results suggest that to maximize the probability of promotion to 0-5 and
0-6, respectively, an officer would simply need to complete graduate education prior to
the 0-5 Promotion Board, and resident JPME prior to the 0-6 Promotion Board. The
opportunity to complete both of these investments during a career often proves difficult,
especially, in light of the critical balance that exists between competing priorities in a
URL Naval officer career. Based on this analysis, there are a number of possible
combinations ofJPME and GRAD ED that can be accomplished. The most effective
methods available to combine JPME and GRAD ED currently include:
1
.
While completing JPME at a Service school, complete a graduate degree:
a. From an affiliated University (e.g., Salve Regina).
b. From the Service school (e.g., NWC).
2. While completing GRAD ED at NPS, complete:
a. Nonresident (correspondence or seminar) JPME.
b. The NPS JEEP. 91
This discussion has presented several methods to increase career efficiency and
effectiveness by combining JPME and GRAD ED. Each method provides an added
benefit of allowing more time in a career to concentrate on the core competencies of
91 This option is not available to all NPS students. Phase I JPME credit for
completing the NPS JEEP only applies to select NPS National Security Affairs curricula.
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community-specific training. In light of this discussion, exploring additional methods of
combining or streamlining JPME and GRAD ED in a URL career merit further analysis.
C. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
The initial background discussion in this study reveals the Navy believes its
peacetime mission is more imminently strategic than the other Services'. This basic belief
stems from the Navy's peacetime performance of global presence. Thus, it's this primary
emphasis on operational mission completion which acts as the driving force behind the
building-block approach to a URL Naval officer career ~ with "command at sea" being
seen as the ultimate prize. The somewhat paradoxical implication of this statement is that
"good Navy officers are less likely to focus on the strategic importance of their mission
than on engineering." 92 The net result is a Navy organizational culture that places very
little reliance upon "jointness."
Over the years, service culture had evolved to a point where some members of
Congress viewed it as dysfunctional. In 1986, Congress intervened to change service
culture by passing legislation — the result was the GNA. To provide for this change, the
JSO career path was born, and to ensure quality officers became JSOs, GNA imposed a
number of career requirements on the Services. The Navy has had to come to grips with
balancing the additional requirements ofGNA in a URL Naval officer career. For the
Navy, it has become what this author refers to as a "career balancing act." The following
92 Freihman, George, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American
World Dimensions in the 21st Century, Crown Publishers, New York, 1996.
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depiction shows a presumed balancing between different forms of human capital
investment required to efficiently and effectively manage a URL Naval officer career.
JPMEX X JDA
GRAD ED \ / PME
TRAINING
Figure 6. 1 . Career Balancing Act.
As one can readily see, the sides of the pentagon in Figure 6.1 have been drawn of
equal length. Admittedly, at different times in a career one of these sides may require
greater emphasis than the other. However, the challenge of career management is not to
let the emphasis on any one side become so focused that the pentagon rendered incapable
of functioning. There are many things to consider when providing a balance in the URL
Naval officer career. This analysis suggests to provide a balance in the area of JPME, one
must consider four primary effects, which include: completion, retention, promotion and
interaction with other forms ofhuman capital investment (i.e., graduate education).
In conclusion, throughout this analysis completion ofJPME has proven its benefit
to both the individual and the DON. Acting as a signalling device, for the officer, it
demonstrates his/her interest in future professional development, and as treated by the
DON, it represents organizational faith in the officer's future potential for discharging
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responsibilities associated with high level command and staff positions. This overall
concept is in keeping with the Navy's stated goals ofJPME. Consequently, the mutual
agreement provided by both parties when entering into the human capital investment of
JPME, results is a win-win situation for everyone involved. The overriding issue
remains how to manage the complexities of these human capital investments by
minimizing the impacts to the interested parties in order to provide maximum efficiency
and effectiveness.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis marks a first attempt at applying the CJCS JPME structure to
determine the overall effect ofJPME on the URL Naval officer career. Suffice it to say
that JPME is a fairly complex issue, especially, in the context of the URL Naval officer
career management. Admittedly, this analysis only managed to scratch the surface of
what will continue to be an extremely complex issue. However, it provides some
important insight into the impacts ofJPME on the URL Naval officer career. The
following recommendations are provided in view of this analysis.
1. The results of this thesis are important, because they provide additional insight
into one aspect ofURL officer career management which has seen very little quantifiable
analysis. Therefore, these results should be made readily available to all Naval officers ~
G/FO and regular officers alike.
2. Service School Codes (SSCs) should be updated to include all current levels,
phases, and sources of JPME, thereby, allowing effective and efficient monitoring of
important human capital resource allocations. Particular areas of emphasis include:
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a. Individual SSCs for each nonresident source.
b. SSC distinctions between intermediate and senior level Phase II.
c. SSC distinctions between intermediate and senior level nonresident JPME.
d. SSC for Naval Postgraduate School JEEP.
3. A separate JPME selection process should be implemented which gives
consideration to all levels, phases, and sources ofJPME. If the foregoing were to be
implemented, the NPS initiative to provide JPME will present considerable difficulty in
implementing that regard. However, effective resource allocation and appropriate
management procedures indicate a separate selection board process may be necessary.
E. FURTHER RESEARCH
In spite of its complexity, JPME is an important topic for future research.
Therefore the following areas serve as areas warrant further research concerning JPME:
1
.
Models to determine the effect ofJPME on promotion should be developed for
each URL community. This method of analysis will allow a more accurate comparison of
the effects ofJPME across communities. By running separate models, additional insight
into the significance of the LOGIT coefficients would be provided. In turn, it is possible
to link the significance of LOGIT coefficients to marginal probability calculations,
providing greater analytical insight into their validity.
2. Future analyses of the effects ofJPME should be expanded in focus to include
additional years beyond the period spanning from 1986 and 1994. Additionally, in 1995,
the Naval Postgraduate School Joint Elective Education Program (JEEP) was added as
120
another source of JPME, greatly expanding the horizons of JPME. Future studies should
also consider the effects of this new source ofJPME.
3. Additional research should be performed in the region where JPME and
graduate education seemingly begin to interact ~ at the 0-5 and 0-6 level. The transition
that takes place in the URL career from technical competence to the political-military,
strategy and policy dimension is becoming increasingly blurred by the blending of these
two sources of human capital investment. To effectively provide for the transition
between these levels in a career, it is necessary to know more about the interaction that
takes place at this level between JPME and graduate education. Additional research in
this area may provide further insight into additional methods of streamlining the JPME
and graduate education processes, thereby providing greater efficiency, while at the same
time maintaining overall career effectiveness.
4. Additional research should be performed to determine the nature of interaction
between Phase I and Phase II JPME and JDA. As a result ofGNA in 1986, these added
milestones have become significant hurdles to navigate in a career. Further analysis
would provide additional insight into possible ways to effectively navigate these hurdles
















APPENDIX A. OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
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SWOS DIVISION OFFICER AND ENROUTE TRAINING
SOURCE: Naval Officer Career Planning Guidebook
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APPENDIX C. AVIATION OFFICER CAREER PATH
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SOURCE: Naval Officer Career Planning Guidebook
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SOURCE: Naval Officer Career Planning Guidebook
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APPENDIX E. ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION DESIGNATOR (AQD)
AQD DESCRIPTION AND CRITERIA
JS1
JPME GRADUATE: Graduates of National War College, ICAF or AFSC
prior to 1 June 1990. Includes all June 1989 War College graduates plus Navy
War college March (intermediate) and November graduates.
JS2 JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTJDA) CREDIT: For completion ofJDAL
billet after January 1, 1987 or a previously qualifying billet.
JS3
JPME JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER (JSO) NOMINEE: JPME graduate
serving in or having served in JDAL. Does not mean will now, or in the
future, be considered for JSO designation. Administrative AQD.
JS4
COS JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER (JSO) NOMINEE: URL officer who
has not graduated from JPME serving in or has served in JDAL. Does not
mean will now, or in the future, be considered for JSO designation.
Administrative AQD.
JS5
JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER: Completed JPME and JDA JSO
requirements, and has been selected by Navy JSO board, approved and
designated by SECDEF.
JS6
JOINT DUTY EQUIVALENT CREDIT: For in-service billet joint service
credit for pre 1 October 1986 tour. Counts as joint credit for Flag only, ends
January 1, 1994.
JS7
PHASE I JPME GRADUATE: Graduate of any the U.S. Service colleges
(between January 85 and January 89 and after January 90) designated
Fellowship or Foreign Service Colleges.
JS8 PHASE II JPME GRADUATE: Graduate ofAFSC after June 1990.
JS9 COS TAKEOUT: Officer designated a JSO based on COS takeout tour
provision (2 year).
SOURCE: Perspective, January 1996/PERS-455.
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APPENDIX F. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL RESIDENT SERVICE SCHOOLS.
ssc INT SR DESCRIPTION
414 X Naval War College, Command and Staff Course
700 X Air Command and Staff College
718 X U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
746 X U.S. Marine Corps Command and General Staff College
SOURCE: Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications Manual
APPENDIX G. SENIOR LEVEL RESIDENT SERVICE SCHOOLS.
SSC INT SR DESCRIPTION
419 X Naval War College , Naval Warfare Course
704 X Air War College
714 X U.S. Army War College
745 X U.S. Marine Corps War College
SOURCE: Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications Manual
APPENDIX H. NONRESIDENT SERVICE SCHOOLS.
SSC INT SR DESCRIPTION
420 X X Naval War College, Correspondence Course
421 X X Naval War College, Off Campus Seminar Course
705 X X Air War College, Correspondence and Seminar
SOURCE: Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications Manual
133
134
APPENDIX I. FEDERAL EXECUTIVE FELLOWSHIP (FEF) PROGRAMS.
ssc INT SR DESCRIPTION
401 X White House Fellows Program
402 X White House Fellows Program
403* X X Federal Executive Fellowship Program (General)
430 X Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, State Department
432 X Senior Officials in National Security, Harvard University
435 X Military Fellowship Program (Pol-Mil), New York
*Note: Accounts for all FEF Programs not explicitly noted above.
SOURCE: Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications Manual
APPENDIX J. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL JOINT SERVICE SCHOOLS.
SSC INT SR DESCRIPTION
400 X Armed Forces Staff College (Prior to June 1 990)
SOURCE: Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications Manual
APPENDIX K. SENIOR LEVEL JOINT SERVICE SCHOOLS.
SSC INT SR DESCRIPTION
408 X Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
410 X National War College
SOURCE: Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications Manual
APPENDIX L. INTERMEDIATE AND SENIOR LEVEL JOINT SCHOOLS.
SSC INT SR DESCRIPTION
424 X X Armed Forces Staff College (After June 1990)
SOURCE: Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications Manual
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APPENDIX M. FOREIGN SERVICE SCHOOLS.
ssc INT SR DESCRIPTION
420 X NATO Defence College, Rome
440 X Inter-American Defense College, Washington, DC
735 X Royal College of Defence Studies, London
736 X United Kingdom Joint Services Staff College, Lattimer
737 X Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich
738 X Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell
739* X X Foreign War College (General)
740 X Canadian National Defence College, Ontario
750 X French Naval War College, Paris
760 X Spanish Naval War College, Madrid
761 X Argentina Naval War College, Buenos Aires
762 X Canadian Command and Staff College, Ottowa
763 X Japanese Naval War College, Tokyo
764 X Japanese National Defense College
765 X Norwegian War College, Oslo
766 X Republic of China Command and Staff College, Taipei
770 X German Command and General Staff College, Hamburg
771 X Indian National Defense Services Staff College
772 X Peru Naval War College, Lima
773 X Venezuela Naval War College, Caracas
774 X Brazil Naval War College, Rio De Janiero
775 X Uruguay Naval War College, Montevideo
776 X Australian Joint Services Staff College, Canberra
* Note: Accounts for all Foreign Service Colleges not explicitly noted above.
SOURCE: Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications Manual
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APPENDIX N. LIST OF VARIABLES FOR 0-5 PROMOTION MODEL
VARIABLE DEFINITION
PROMOTE if not selected for promotion
1 if selected for promotion
MARRIED if not married
1 if married
AGEOl Age at commissioning
UGRDTECH if did not complete technical undergraduate major
1 if completed technical undergraduate major
APC1 Undergraduate GPA
APC2 Undergraduate Calculus Grades
APC3 Undergraduate Physics Grades
RAPPED12 if not recommended for accelerated promotion at 0-1 or 0-2
1 if recommended for accelerated promotion at 0-1 or 0-2
RAPPED3 If not recommended for accelerated promotion at 0-3
1 if recommended for accelerated promotion at 0-3
NITESCHL if not completed graduate degree on own time
1 if completed graduate degree on own time
SALVEREG if not completed graduate degree at Salve Regina College
1 if completed graduate degree at Salve Regina College
NWCDEGR if not granted graduate degree at Naval War College
1 if granted graduate degree at Naval War College
FFUNDNPS if not completed graduate degree at Naval Postgraduate School
1 if completed graduate degree at Naval Postgraduate School
FFUNDCIV if not completed graduate degree at CIVINS Program School
1 if completed graduate degree at CIVINS Program School
UTILIZE if not granted credit for utilizing subspecialty graduate degree
1 if granted credit for utilizing subspecialty graduate degree
ANYJPME if not completed any JPME
1 if completed any JPME
JDA if not completed assignment on JDAL
1 if completed assignment on JDAL
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APPENDIX O. LIST OF VARIABLES FOR 0-6 PROMOTION MODEL
VARIABLE DEFINITION
PROMOTE if not selected for promotion
1 if selected for promotion
MARRIED if not married
1 if married
AGEOl Age at commissioning
UGRDTECH if did not complete technical undergraduate degree
1 if completed technical undergraduate degree
APC1 Undergraduate GPA
APC2 Undergraduate Calculus Grades
APC3 Undergraduate Physics Grades
RAPPED12 if not recommended for accelerated promotion at 0- 1 or 0-2
1 if recommended for accelerated promotion at 0-1 or 0-2
RAPPED3 If not recommended for accelerated promotion at 0-3
1 if recommended for accelerated promotion at 0-3
TIME04 Time spent at the rank of 0-4
ANYGRAD if not complete any graduate degree
1 if completed any graduate degree
UTILIZE if not granted credit for utilizing subspecialty graduate degree
1 if granted credit for utilizing subspecialty graduate degree
ANYJPME if not completed any JPME
1 if completed any JPME
INTRES if not completed Intermediate Resident Phase I JPME
1 if completed Intermediate Resident Phase I JPME
SRRES if not completed Senior Resident Phase I JPME
1 if completed Senior Resident Phase I JPME
NONRES if not completed Nonresident Phase I JPME
1 if completed Nonresident Phase I JPME
PHIIONLY if not completed Phase II JPME at AFSC after June 1990
1 if completed Phase II JPME at AFSC after June 1990
BOTHINT if not completed Phase I/II JPME at AFSC before June 1990
1 if completed Phase I/II JPME at AFSC before June 1990
BOTHSR if not completed Phase I/II JPME at NWC or ICAF
1 if completed Phase I/II JPME at NWC or ICAF
EQUIV if not granted Phase I credit for completion of FEF or Foreign
1 if granted Phase I credit for completion of FEF or Foreign
JDA if not completed assignment on JDAL
1 if completed assignment on JDAL
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APPENDIX P. SPREADSHEET CALCULATIONS FOR 0-5 MARGINALS
VARIABLE X
OLS
MARGINAL X*MARGINAL LOGIT X*LOGIT
LOGIT
MARGINAL
INTERCEPT 1 1.212259 1.212259 3.5519 3.5519 -
MARRIED 0.091619 0.4597 0.090801587
AGE01 22.9932302 -0.034718 -0.798279 -0.1719 -3.9525363 -0.033954302
UGRDTECH -0.045054 -0.2447 -0.048334019
APC1 2.4775254 -0.024489 -0.06067212 -0.1319 -0.3267856 -0.026053359
APC2 2.99776373 -0.005016 -0.015036783 -0.0279 -0.0836376 -0.005510908
APC3 3.5493437 -0.008991 -0.031912149 -0.0504 -0.1788869 -0.009955188
RAPPED12 0.197986 1.0655 0.210461368
RAPPED3 0.210826 0.9927 0.196081652
NIGHTSCHL 0.039989 0.2144 0.042349054
SALVEREG 0.119458 0.6667 0.131688967
NWCDEGR 0.087181 0.4734 0.09350766
FFUNDNPS 0.08034 0.479 0.094613792
FFUNDCIV 0.086528 0.4798 0.094771811
UTILIZE -0.107274 -0.5942 -0.117368508
ANYJPME 0.015557 0.082 0.016196933
JDA -0.054093 -0.2859 -0.05647199
NUC 0.070796 0.4194 0.082841387
PIL 0.082801 0.4323 0.085389441
NFO -0.024529 -0.1044 -0.020621461
P = 0.306359 Z = -0.989946
P = 0.2709227
SOURCE: DR. William Bowman, U.S. Naval Academy
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APPENDIX Q. SPREADSHEET CALCULATIONS FOR 0-6 MARGINALS
VARIABLE X
OLS
MARGINAL X*MARGINAL LOGIT X*LOGIT
LOGIT
MARGINAL
INTERCEPT 1 1.761767 1.761767 5.9716 5.9716 -
MARRIED 0.140921 0.6313 0.13066827
AGEOl 22.3344371 -0.018 -0.40202 -0.0845 -1.8872599 -0.01749005
UGRDTECH -0.021592 -0.0965 -0.019973845
APC1 3.7777778 -0.027365 -0.103378889 -0.127 -0.4797778 -0.026286821
APC2 3.1215805 -0.013908 -0.043414942 -0.065 -0.2029027 -0.013453885
APC3 3.5439598 0.006726 0.023836674 0.0328 0.11624188 0.006789037
RAPPED12 0.11461 0.5409 0.111957021
RAPPED3 0.113082 0.5082 0.105188682
TIME04 5.8535769 -0.15896 -0.930484584 -0.7518 -4.4007191 -0.155609703
ANYGRAD 0.019168 0.0841 0.017407257
UTILIZE -0.054516 -0.244 -0.050503814
INTRES 0.085429 0.3757 0.077763455
SRRES 0.171647 0.7837 0.162212456
NONRES -0.11402 -0.5122 -0.106016613
PHIIONLY 0.175603 1.0215 0.211432976
BOTfflNT -0.000431 -0.00207 -0.000428454
BOTHSR 0.192268 0.8927 0.184773586
EQUIV 0.083093 0.3925 0.081240767
JDA -0.159456 -0.7245 -0.149959071
NUC 0.109513 0.4911 0.101649275
PIL -0.000802 0.00103 0.000213192
NFO -0.150983 -0.6807 -0.140893223
P = 0.306305 Z = -0.882818
P = 0.2925942







Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218








4. Professor Gregory G. Hildebrandt, Code SM/Hi 1
Department of Systems Management
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93942
5. Professor R. Mitchell Brown, Code NS/Br 3
Department ofNational Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93942
6. LCDR Daniel J. Walsh 1
Patrol Squadron Twenty Six (VP-26)
Naval Air Station Brunswick
Brunswick, ME 04011




8. Office of Secretary of Defense 1
Force Management Policy
4000 Defense Pentagon
Attn: CDR Patricia Leonard, USN
Washington, DC 20301-4000
147
9. Director for Manpower and Personnel (J-l)
Joint Manpower Division
1000 Joint Staff Pentagon
Attn: CAPT Thomas Davilli, USN
Washington, DC 20318-1000
10. Military Education Division (J-7)
7000 Joint Staff Pentagon
Room 1A724
Attn: CAPT Patrick Denny, USN
Washington, DC 20318-1000
11. Chief ofNaval Operations (OPNAV N-731)
200 Navy Pentagon
Attn: CDR Donna Hirabayashi, USN
Washington, DC 20350-2000

















3 2768 00337609 6
